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Article

When Should Employers Be Liable for
Factoring Biased Customer Feedback into
Employment Decisions?
Dallan F. Flake †
INTRODUCTION
Following a checkup at the local medical clinic, Mark stops
by the reception desk to fill out an anonymous survey about his
visit in exchange for ten dollars off his bill. Mark skims the questionnaire, rates his doctor, Melanie Flowers, mostly threes (out
of five), and is on his way. When the clinic is forced to lay off one
of its doctors two months later, it decides to terminate Dr. Flowers because she has the lowest patient-satisfaction scores. Dr.
Flowers subsequently files a sex discrimination lawsuit against
the clinic based on her suspicion Mark and other patients rated
her lower because she is a woman. If Dr. Flowers is right, should
the clinic be liable?
The answer to this question is more complicated than it
might seem. If the feedback for Dr. Flowers was explicitly sexist,
and the medical clinic knew it—suppose Mark had written
“Women belong in the home, not the doctor’s office!” across the
bottom of his survey—it seems reasonable to hold the clinic liable, because it knew the feedback was sexist and still factored it
into the termination decision. But what if neither Mark nor any
other patient had written anything sexist on the survey, yet
nonetheless rated Dr. Flowers lower because they viewed female
doctors as less competent than male doctors? Would it still make
sense to hold the clinic liable if it had no reason to suspect Dr.
Flowers’s ratings, which were just slightly lower than the other
doctors’ ratings, were tainted by bias? Taking it a step further,
what if Mark and the other respondents genuinely thought they
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were being objective in their ratings, but their unconscious biases nonetheless skewed their perceptions of Dr. Flowers, causing them to give her lower ratings? Could the clinic be liable for
using customer feedback that nobody—including the raters
themselves—suspected was sexist?
This hypothetical raises important and novel questions that
current employment discrimination laws seem ill equipped to
answer. Indeed, it is not merely coincidental that by the end of
2017 there still were no published court opinions directly addressing whether, or to what extent, employers should be liable
for using discriminatory customer feedback to make employment
decisions (what I refer to as “customer feedback discrimination”).
The most instructive guidance in this regard derives from customer preference cases, in which courts routinely hold that employers cannot discriminate against employees based on customers’ discriminatory preferences.1 But those cases universally
involve customer preferences that are blatantly discriminatory;
so while they are useful in thinking about how courts would analyze the first scenario (where Mark left an explicitly sexist comment at the bottom of his survey), they are not particularly helpful in the latter two situations, where the bias is not obvious to
the employer either because the respondents disguise their biases as objective ratings or because the respondents are unaware
their implicit biases tainted their ratings.
While courts and scholars alike have heavily scrutinized employers’ reliance on biased employee evaluations from supervisors in making employment decisions, 2 employers’ use of biased
1. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the
perceived . . . preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for
treating employees differently . . . .”); Pleener v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ.,
311 F. App’x 479, 482 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We agree that federal law does not permit
an employer to discriminate based on race to accommodate the actual or perceived invidious biases of its clientele.”); Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551,
1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) (“ The existence of . . . third party preferences for discrimination does not, of course, justify discriminatory hiring practices.”); Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[I]t would be
totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid.”); Williams v.
G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., No. ELH-10-3476, 2012 WL 1698282, at *22 (D.
Md. May 11, 2012) (“Courts have repeatedly held employers responsible for discrimination against their employees, even when the employer itself claimed to
be free of bias.”).
2. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)
(alleging sexist performance evaluations the plaintiff received earlier in her tenure with the employer had resulted in lower pay than her male colleagues
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customer feedback to make employment decisions has gone
largely unchecked. Only recently have commentators raised concerns that this practice could open the door to discrimination
claims. Noah Zatz contends that employers should not be able to
“launder” out discriminatory intent from an employment decision merely because such intent is folded into a customer’s feedback. 3 More recently, Lu-in Wang has argued that the law
should not allow discrimination in employment to masquerade
as customer service and should “hold employers accountable for
the ways in which they facilitate, and benefit from, customers’
discrimination against service workers.” 4 Zatz proposes, and
Wang endorses, 5 an accommodation-based model of liability,
whereby an employer could be held liable for basing an employment decision on discriminatory customer feedback if: “(1) The
employee suffered employment-related harm . . . [;] (2) [t]he employee suffered that harm because of her membership in a protected class . . . [;] and (3) [t]here is a basis for holding the employer responsible.”6 Although this theory sheds new and
important light on how existing frameworks can be refashioned
to address customer feedback discrimination, it appears the
model would only reach cases involving explicitly discriminatory
customer feedback.7 Thus we are still left to wonder how the law
should respond when employers base employment decisions on
customer feedback in which the taint of bias is less obvious.

through the end of her career); McGowan v. Bd. of Trs. of Metro. State Univ.,
645 F. App’x 667, 670 (10th Cir. 2016) (alleging race discrimination and retaliation based on poor performance reviews); Kayky v. Boeing Co., No. C150488RSL, 2016 WL 6525808, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2016) (alleging negative
performance evaluations were pretext for national origin discrimination); R.
Lawrence Ashe, Jr. & Ginger S. McRae, Performance Evaluations Go to Court
in the 1980’s [sic], 36 MERCER L. REV. 887, 892–97 (1985) (discussing how subjective performance evaluation systems are susceptible to legal challenges);
Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005) (arguing that implicit bias
affects performance evaluations).
3. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1357, 1416–17 (2009).
4. Lu-in Wang, When the Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination
as Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 250 (2016).
5. See id. at 286–91.
6. Zatz, supra note 3, at 1413.
7. See id. at 1416–22 (identifying examples where the accommodationbased model limits liability to cases involving explicitly discriminatory customer feedback).
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I argue in this Article that the dearth of attention given to
customer feedback discrimination from courts and scholars alike
is not because the problem is nonexistent or inconsequential. To
the contrary, a growing chorus of researchers has found that
both explicit and implicit bias often taint customer feedback, 8
and firms regularly rely on such feedback to make employment
decisions. 9 The problem lies in the fact that customer feedback
discrimination does not fit neatly under either the disparate
treatment or the disparate impact model of discrimination—the
only two judicially endorsed pathways to proving discrimination
under antidiscrimination statutes—making it virtually impossible for a victim of such discrimination to prevail in court. Drawing upon my previous work on employer liability for nonemployee discrimination more generally,10 I contend that courts can
and should remedy this injustice by assessing employer liability
for customer feedback discrimination under a negligence standard. In essence, a court (or jury) need only ask two questions to
determine liability in such cases: (1) did the employer know, or
should it reasonably have known, that the customer feedback
was biased; if so, (2) did the employer act reasonably in response
by taking appropriate preventive or corrective measures? A negligence standard undoubtedly would make it easier for customer
feedback discrimination plaintiffs to prevail. Yet the standard
would not be so stringent that an employer would be strictly liable whenever biased feedback taints an employment decision. Indeed, a negligence standard is advantageous because it would
encourage employers to take reasonable measures to prevent
such discrimination without substantially impairing their business operations. This standard is also advantageous insofar as it
can be applied with relative ease in both the easy cases, where
bias is clear and explicit, and the harder cases, where bias is
more difficult to detect. Returning to the introductory hypothetical, the medical clinic’s liability under a negligence standard
would depend on both its knowledge of and response to the biased feedback.
Now is an especially critical time to consider the parameters
of employer liability for customer feedback discrimination. This
is not a problem likely to go away anytime soon; in fact, there
are strong indicators it may become even worse. As I explain in
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See generally Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee
Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1169 (2017).

2018]

CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION

2173

Part I, we live in a customer-service-obsessed society in which
consumers are constantly bombarded with requests for feedback.
Employers use this feedback to make an array of employment
decisions and this seems unlikely to change anytime soon, with
technological advances making customer feedback even easier
and less expensive to obtain
Given the ubiquity of customer feedback and the high value
employers place on it, one might logically assume the feedback
is highly reliable in its depiction of consumers’ attitudes toward
goods and services. In Part II, I analyze several key studies that
not only cast serious doubt on this assumption, but also show
that customer feedback is often tainted by explicit and, perhaps
more commonly, implicit biases that adversely impact how consumers rate service exchanges.
In Part III, I address how customer feedback discrimination
claims fit into the extant legal frameworks. I argue that neither
the disparate treatment nor the disparate impact analytical
framework is fully equipped to handle customer feedback discrimination claims and, in fact, have made such claims virtually
unwinnable.
In light of these deficiencies, I propose in Part IV that employers be held to a negligence standard in customer feedback
discrimination cases. I explain how applying a negligence standard is consistent with how courts analyze certain other types of
employment discrimination claims. I argue that a reasonable
knowledge standard would provide a viable path to recovery for
victims of customer feedback discrimination because they would
only have to prove the employer should have known the feedback
was biased and failed to reasonably respond. I likewise contend
that a negligence standard would strike an appropriate balance
between incentivizing firms to make reasonable efforts to prevent and correct customer feedback biases without detrimentally
impacting their business operations.
I. CUSTOMER FEEDBACK IN THE MODERN ECONOMY
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of customer
satisfaction in the modern economy. Today’s customer-centric
business environment is a result of several factors, including the
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rise of the service economy, 11 increased competition among businesses, 12 the global quality revolution,13 and the ease with which
firms can now gather customer metrics. 14 Catchphrases such as
“the customer is always right,” “customer satisfaction is our
highest priority,” and “the customer is king” are common in the
business world, 15 as firms strive to differentiate their goods and
services from those of their competitors. President Clinton famously acknowledged the importance of customer service in
1993 when he introduced the National Partnership for Reinventing Government—an initiative that sought to reform the way the
federal government worked, in part by reimagining ordinary citizens as customers and by requiring agencies to set and meet
specific customer-service standards. 16 The importance of keeping customers satisfied is further illustrated by a recent survey
of over five hundred U.S. business executives, ninety-four percent of whom agreed that listening to customer feedback is increasingly critical to their organization’s bottom line, and ninety

11. See ANDERS GUSTAFSSON & MICHAEL D. JOHNSON, COMPETING IN A
SERVICE ECONOMY: HOW TO CREATE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH
SERVICE DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION xiv (2003) (describing how customers
in the service economy are “an essential source of information, innovation, and
creativity”).
12. See Michael J. Mazzeo, Competition and Service Quality in the U.S. Airline Industry, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG. 275 (2003) (explaining that when customers
are presented with more choices, firms have an incentive to improve customer
satisfaction by offering higher-quality goods, better service, and lower prices to
maintain their market share).
13. See DEREK R. ALLEN, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 1 (2004) (“Customer satisfaction has its roots in the global quality revolution.”).
14. See Jenny van Doorn et al., Customer Engagement Behavior: Theoretical Foundations and Research Directions, 13 J. SERV. RES. 253, 253–54 (2010)
(describing the rise of customer-based metrics as a means for measuring performance).
15. See, e.g., BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE
AGE OF AMAZON 111 (2013) (describing Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos as obsessed
about delivering a “flawless” customer experience); Customer Is King, ALLEYNE’S GENTLEMEN’S GROOMING CTR., http://alleynesgrooming.com/customer
-is-king (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (“Visit us at Alleyne’s, where we believe our
Customer is King and we aim to serve every man like one.”); EDDIE SMIT’S
AUTO. SOLS., http://www.autorepairwhitehousetn.com (last visited Apr. 22,
2018) (“Your Satisfaction is Our Highest Priority!”); Contact Us, MOELLER MFG.
& SUPPLY, INC., http://www.moellermfg.com/contact (last visited Apr. 22, 2018)
(“Your satisfaction is our top priority and we’ll endeavor to maintain our status
of 100% customer satisfaction.”).
16. See John Kamensky, A Brief History, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR REINVENTING
GOV’T (Jan. 1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoweare/history2.html.
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percent of whom reported that having customer feedback on employees helps identify “rising stars.” 17
Given the almost fanatical value placed on customer satisfaction, it is hardly surprising that firms go to remarkable
lengths to solicit customers’ opinions on everything from employees to ambiance. Although soliciting customer feedback is hardly
a new phenomenon, 18 the methodological and technological advances in how firms gather feedback are extraordinary. For most
of the twentieth century, customer feedback tended to be measured informally, such as by front line staff asking people if they
were happy or annual paper surveys of customers. 19 However,
by the 1980s, businesses began moving away from their almost
singular focus on making the best product and became increasingly concerned with boosting customer satisfaction. 20 Firms employed a variety of mechanisms to collect customer feedback, including paper surveys, comments cards, focus groups, mystery
shoppers, polling, in-person interviews, usability testing, suggestion boxes, and some inbound and outbound phone calls.21 In
the early 1990s, Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing became widespread, as did comparatively short-lived experiments
with faxed and disk-by-mail surveys. 22
The advent of the Internet has significantly expanded feedback possibilities. Mobile device ratings, in-app ratings, webbased pop-up surveys, email and text surveys, live chats over the
internet, dedicated feedback space on websites, community
groups and discussion boards, review sites, and social media
sites like Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter, 23 allow
firms to reach more customers more quickly and inexpensively
17. See Listening to Customer and Employee Outcomes Key to Business Performance, HUNDREDX, INC. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://hundredxinc.com/news/87.
18. See A Brief History of Survey Research, PRAIRIE RESEARCH ASSOCS.,
http://www.pra.ca/resources/pages/files/technotes/history_e.pdf (last visited
Apr. 22, 2018) (tracing the history of surveys from the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages, and early nineteenth century Great Britain).
19. See Ray Poynter, The Rise of Customer Satisfaction Research, VISION
CRITICAL (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.visioncritical.com/rise-customer
-satisfaction-research.
20. Id.
21. See DEREK R. ALLEN, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 1–14 (2004).
22. See Poynter, supra note 19.
23. See Ginny Marvin, Twitter Launches New Customer Service Feedback
and Engagement Tools for Businesses, MARKETING LAND (Feb. 18, 2016), http://
www.marketingland.com/164993-164993 (discussing Twitter ’s recent rollout of
two new tools for companies to provide support and get feedback from customers).
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than ever before. 24 Indeed, it is now common for firms to receive
customer feedback without even soliciting it, as Yelp, Amazon,
Google, and other web-based services create independent spaces
for customers to share their judgments on a host of different
goods and services. In turn, companies such as the Audience 25
and Sprout Social 26 offer products that allow businesses to monitor, measure, and even respond to customer-initiated feedback.
The explosion in feedback mechanisms means customers are
bombarded with feedback requests seemingly at every turn. SurveyMonkey, one of the largest online survey developers and distributors, reports that it alone receives three million survey responses per day.27 In the course of writing this Article, I received
customer satisfaction questionnaires in the mail from my realtor, health insurance company, and mechanic. During telephone
calls to my bank and credit-card company, I was invited to stay
on the line to rate my experience with the customer service representatives. Several apps on my phone requested I rate them.
A postal worker showed me on my receipt where I could go online
to give feedback about my experience at the Post Office. After a
recent trip, I received follow-up emails from an airline, hotel, and
car-rental agency requesting my feedback on my experience with
their services. Uber asked me to rate my driver. I spotted a How’s
my driving? sticker (complete with a telephone number to call)
on the bumper of a semitruck. I lost track of how many survey
requests popped up on websites I visited. A casebook publisher
invited me to participate in a focus group. Various restaurants,
hotels, a doctor’s office, and yes, even the DMV, made customer
comment cards available to me. A customs officer at an Asian
airport asked me to tap either a smiley face or a frowny face on
an electronic tablet to indicate my satisfaction with her service.
My credit-card company solicited my feedback during an online
chat. And upon returning to my vehicle after dining out, my vehicle’s navigation system asked me to rate the restaurant.
24. See generally Robert A. Opoku, Gathering Customer Feedback Online
and Swedish SMEs, 29 MGMT. RES. NEWS 106 (2006) (exploring and describing
tools used by small- and medium-sized enterprises to collect customer feedback
using internet-based tools); Scott E. Sampson, Gathering Customer Feedback
Via the Internet: Instruments and Prospects, 98 INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 71
(1998) (discussing various ways in which the internet has expanded firms’ abilities to collect customer feedback).
25. AUDIENCE, http://www.theaudience.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
26. SPROUT SOCIAL, http://sproutsocial.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
27. How SurveyMonkey Gets Its Data, SURVEYMONKEY, https://www
.surveymonkey.com/mp/survey-methodology (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
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The proliferation of customer feedback requests is troubling
on a number of fronts, particularly its tendency to cause rater
fatigue. Research shows that survey response rates peaked between 1960 and 1990 and have been falling precipitously ever
since. 28 Indeed, one study found that telephone survey cooperation rates plunged from forty-three percent in 1997 to a mere
fourteen percent in 2012. 29 And online-survey response rates are
even lower, with some studies showing participation rates averaging a paltry two percent. 30 Customers seem to be particularly
weary of online surveys; nearly three-quarters report that surveys interfered with the experience of a website, eighty percent
admitted to abandoning a survey halfway through, and nearly
two-thirds expressed a preference for giving feedback by actively
reaching out.31 Even Fred Reichheld, inventor of a popular short
consumer survey to test brand loyalty, thinks the customer feedback craze has gone too far, recently quipping: “The instant we
have a technology to minimize surveys, I’m the first one on that
bandwagon.” 32 Rater fatigue has been shown to suppress response rates, which in turn can affect the accuracy of the data. 33
Employers factor customer feedback into a vast array of
business decisions, including employment-related decisions such
as who to hire, promote, discipline, and fire; employees’ pay
rates, bonuses, tips, and other remuneration; and work schedules, job duties, and other assignments. One study found that
about half of large U.S. companies include customer feedback in
their incentive compensation. 34 Moreover, in their influential
qualitative study of how fifteen firms used customer feedback to
28. David Wheeler, The Rising Revolt Against Customer Surveys, WEEK
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/577882/rising-revolt-against
-customer-surveys.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Lydia Dishman, Retailers: Your Surveys Are Making Customers
Suffer, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lydiadishman/2014/
03/07/retailers-your-surveys-are-making-customers-suffer/#7a885956581a.
32. Jennifer Kaplan, The Inventor of Customer Satisfaction Surveys Is Sick
of Them, Too, BLOOMBERG TECH. (May 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-05-04/tasty-taco-helpful-hygienist-are-all-those-surveys-of
-any-use.
33. See, e.g., Stephen R. Porter et al., Multiple Surveys of Students and Survey Fatigue, 2004 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL RES. 63 (finding that
administering multiple surveys to students in one academic year significantly
reduced response rates in later surveys).
34. See Jeff Marr, Tying Employee Compensation to Customer Feedback: It
Really Works!, CUSTOMER THINK (Apr. 23, 2006), http://customerthink.com/
tying_employee_compensation_to_customer_feedback.
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manage their employees, Linda Fuller and Vicki Smith found
that on average, each firm utilized five different customer feedback mechanisms.35 They further discovered that every business
they interviewed used feedback mechanisms that allowed customers to identify specific employees, 36 and that customers “relayed detailed information about individual employee’s [sic] behavior and attitudes” in response to questions such as: “Were
your nurses concerned?,” “How was your salesperson’s appearance?,” and “Was our employee quick and efficient at the cash
register?” 37 The researchers observed that “such detailed feedback about specific employees derived from customers was funneled into employees’ personnel files and often used in bureaucratic systems of evaluation and discipline.” 38 For instance, an
insurance agency routed customer feedback into personnel files,
“on the basis of which periodic quantitative performance reviews
used to determine raises, promotions and the like were prepared.” 39 A supermarket chain inputted information about individual employees from comment cards and customer-initiated
letters into electronic employee files that supervisors subsequently factored into annual employee performance reviews. 40
Interestingly, a car-dealership manager threw away comment
cards containing positive feedback; he saved the negative ones
“for later” and also used summary statistics from monthly customer surveys to pinpoint employees whose numbers deviated
substantially from the norm. 41 And, finally, a union official representing grocery workers reported that managers used customer feedback both to initiate the first stages of disciplinary action, such as verbal and written warnings, and for “temporary
suspensions and on-the-spot terminations.”42
The fact that employers rely on customer feedback to make
employment decisions is significant because such decisions constitute “employment actions” under Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws. 43 This means an employer can be held liable if
35. Linda Fuller & Vicki Smith, Consumers’ Reports: Management by Customers in a Changing Economy, 5 WORK, EMP. & SOC. 1, 5 (1991).
36. Id. at 6–7.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 7–8.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2533 (2015) (“[Title VII] makes it unlawful for an employer to
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a protected characteristic motivates the decision and the employee suffers an adverse impact as a result.44 One may question
the fairness of holding employers exclusively liable in such instances, given it is the customer rather than the employer who
bears the discriminatory animus.45 But even within this framework of exclusive employer liability there exists the potential to
make employer liability for customer feedback discrimination
more commensurate with an employer’s level of culpability.
II. THE PERILS OF CUSTOMER FEEDBACK
Given the prevalence of customer feedback and the high
value companies place on it, one might assume most customer
feedback accurately and objectively reflects a customer’s experience. When gathered correctly, customer satisfaction data certainly can be used to enhance a firm’s performance. 46 However,
too often customer feedback is unreliable—either because of
take a variety of adverse employment actions (such as failing or refusing to hire
a job applicant or discharging an employee) ‘because of ’ religion [or other protected characteristics].”); Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P.,
651 F.3d 664, 677 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] reduction in compensation is a materially
adverse employment action.”); Kercado-Clymer v. City of Amsterdam,
370 F. App’x 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the assignment of less desirable duties may be considered an adverse employment action); Breaux v. City
of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Adverse employment actions are
discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.”
(citation omitted)).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also Tibbs v. Calvary United
Methodist Church, 505 F. App’x 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2012) (“ Title VII prohibits
adverse employment actions if the employee’s race [or other protected characteristic] was a motivating factor, even if other legitimate factors also motivated
the employer ’s decision.”); Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327,
333 (5th Cir. 2005) (“ Title VII expressly prohibits adverse employment actions
that are motivated in part by discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.”).
45. Compare Einat Albin, A Worker-Employer-Customer Triangle: The Case
of Tips, 40 INDUS. L.J. 181, 182, 186–89 (2011) (asserting that customers have,
in effect, become second employers in many cases because of employers’ increased reliance on customer feedback to make employment decisions; as such,
perhaps they should share responsibility for discrimination), with Katharine T.
Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 223,
228–39 (2016) (suggesting the law does not hold customers accountable for their
discrimination against employees because it is more effective to hold employers
liable for such discrimination and out of concern for customers’ personal autonomy and privacy).
46. See generally JANELLE BARLOW & CLAUS MØLLER, A COMPLAINT IS A
GIFT (1996); Sunil Gupta & Valarie Zeithaml, Customer Metrics and Their Impact on Financial Performance, 25 MARKETING SCI. 718 (2006); Neil A. Morgan
& Lopo Leotte Rego, The Value of Different Customer Satisfaction and Loyalty
Metrics in Predicting Business Performance, 25 MARKETING SCI. 426 (2006).
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flaws in the methodologies by which firms collect the data or because respondents consciously or unconsciously permit biases to
skew their responses. Whatever the reason, employers would be
wise to exercise extreme caution before factoring customer feedback into employment decisions.
A. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
When customer feedback started becoming an important
business tool in the mid-twentieth century, few employers
stopped to question its reliability; instead, they seemed to adopt
the mantra that any feedback was good feedback. 47 However, in
recent years numerous studies have revealed widespread and severe methodological flaws associated with customer feedback.
For example, Jonathan Barsky and Stephen Huxley argue that
many customer satisfaction surveys are of “dubious value” because they typically are conducted without regard for who takes
part or the motivation for participating, and thus are susceptible
to nonresponse bias, meaning the respondents differ in meaningful ways from nonrespondents. 48 Feedback instruments also are
often poorly designed, which can lead to content-validity problems because the instruments “are inadequate for measuring
what they are supposed to measure.” 49 For instance, a 2016 analysis of customer feedback tools used by the fifty-one largest U.S.
retailers found the majority to be “critically flawed” and “riddled
with information biases.” 50 Based on an objective evaluation of
fifteen elements, the average survey scored just forty-three out
of one hundred points. 51 The study also found that most of the
surveys were excessively long, nearly one-third of the questions
led customers to give answers the retailer wanted to hear, and
47. See Rob Brogle, How to Avoid the Evils Within Customer Satisfaction
Surveys, ISIXSIGMA, https://www.isixsigma.com/methodology/voc-customer
-focus/how-to-avoid-the-evils-within-customer-satisfaction-surveys (last visited
Apr. 22, 2018) (“[As] [c]ompanies jumped on the survey bandwagon . . . there
was no limit to the misunderstanding, abuse, wrong interpretations, wasted resources, poor management and employee dissatisfaction that would result from
these surveys. Although some companies were savvy enough to understand and
properly interpret their survey results, the majority of companies did not.”).
48. Jonathan D. Barsky & Stephen J. Huxley, A Customer-Survey Tool: Using the “Quality Sample,” 33 CORNELL HOSPITALITY & RESTAURANT ADMIN.
Q. 18, 18–19 (1992).
49. Id. at 19.
50. INTERACTION METRICS, 2016 FINDINGS REPORT: THE STATE OF POP RETAIL SURVEYS, (Nov. 27, 2017), http://interactionmetrics.com/Point-of-Purchase
-Survey-Study/Report.pdf.
51. Id.
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sixty-three percent of surveys had at least one scale that either
lacked a numerical midpoint or used labels that favored toward
the positive. 52
While a full rendering of the methodological inadequacies of
customer feedback is beyond the scope of this Article, three studies highlight some of the more common pitfalls. Moses Altsech’s
analysis of sixty-three medical patient satisfaction surveys
found “serious and fundamental flaws in the questions and
measurement scales embedded in a considerable number of survey instruments.” 53 For instance, seventy-one percent of the surveys contained double-barreled questions, which ask about multiple constructs in the same question but only provide a single
measurement scale to assess the multiple constructs. 54 When respondents are confronted with double-barreled questions, they
sometimes report an average of the multiple ratings, or report
their rating on the construct they consider most important, or do
not respond at all.55 The study likewise found that fifty-seven
percent of patient satisfaction surveys used Likert scales with
nonneutral midpoints. 56 Likert scales typically have five to
seven points, one of which is a midpoint denoting neutral or average judgment, surrounded by equal numbers of negative and
positive points. 57 According to Altsech, a Likert scale with a
nonneutral midpoint can skew feedback by forcing a respondent
who intends to give an “average” rating to give an artificially
high or low rating instead. 58
Kenneth Bartkus and colleagues discovered a number of
methodological defects in their analysis of guest comment cards
from sixty-three major U.S. lodging chains.59 Over half of the
comment cards lacked a satisfactory secure-return mechanism,
such as a locked drop box or postage-paid mail.60 By far, the most
common return method (31.7%) was simply to leave the card at

52. Id.
53. Moses Altsech, Back to Square One: How Patient Satisfaction Survey
Flaws Bias Assessments of Health Care Quality, ATHENS INST. FOR EDUC. &
RES. 1, 9 (2012), https://www.atiner.gr/papers/BUS2012-0032.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Kenneth R. Bartkus et al., The Quality of Guest Comment Cards,
48 J. TRAVEL RES. 162 (2009).
60. Id. at 169.
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the front desk where it was susceptible to tampering from employees.61 Other common flaws in the comment cards included
biased introductory statements, not asking for the respondent’s
email address, overuse of closed-ended questions, lack of writing
space for open comments, imprecise question wording, and unbalanced response options. 62
Sampling bias is another common problem with customer
feedback, not only because participation by the customer is voluntary (thus opening the door to nonresponse bias) but also because of the ways customers are selected to provide feedback.
Yaniv Poria’s study of hotel employees in the United Kingdom
and Israel found a number of factors influenced employees’ deviation from unbiased sampling procedures in how they distributed guest satisfaction questionnaires, including their accessibility to guests, their perceptions of management reaction and
its magnitude if employees’ names were mentioned in the guest’s
comments, their perception of the importance of the data gathered, and whether the employees perceived the questionnaire as
a tool to pacify an agitated guest. 63
B. COGNITIVE BIASES
Customer feedback is also problematic inasmuch as it ultimately consists of subjective judgments that are vulnerable to a
wide range of biases. Such biases may include “the ‘bandwagon
effect,’ confirmation of preexisting beliefs, education or cognitive
ability, and stereotypes based on the race or gender of the person
being rated.” 64 Customer feedback is likewise susceptible to the
halo effect, a cognitive bias in which a respondent’s overall impression of a person influences the respondent’s thoughts and
feelings about the person’s character.65 Halo-contaminated data
“can undermine the interpretability of attribute-specific satisfaction data, obscure the identification of the strengths and weak-

61. Id.
62. Id. at 169–72.
63. Yaniv Poria, Employees’ Interference with the Distribution of Guest Satisfaction Questionnaires, 16 INT’L J. CONTEMP. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 321, 322–
23 (2004).
64. David R. Hekman et al., An Examination of Whether and How Racial
and Gender Biases Influence Customer Satisfaction, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 238,
238–39 (2010).
65. Edward L. Thorndike, A Constant Error in Psychological Ratings, 4 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 25, 25 (1920).
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nesses, and make attribute-specific comparisons across competing brands and products unreliable.” 66 The danger of such biases
skewing customers’ judgments is compounded by the fact that
many raters are naïve, inexperienced, and are not held accountable for the accuracy of their ratings.67 Moreover, customer feedback is often anonymous, which not only decreases accountability but also suppresses “the desire to engage in the effortful
cognitive processing required to conceal or overcome any biases.” 68
While any cognitive bias may compromise the validity of
customer feedback, only those based on race, sex, or some other
protected trait have the potential to expose employers to liability
for discrimination. Sometimes such impermissible biases are
easy to spot because they are overt, intentional, and explicit. For
instance, in an Urbanspoon review of the Atomic Grill in Morgantown, West Virginia, a patron requested that the servers
show “more skin.” 69 In Harrisonburg, Virginia, a couple dining
at a luncheonette refused to leave a tip for their Latina waitress
and instead wrote across the bottom of the receipt, “We only tip
66. Jochen Wirtz, Halo in Customer Satisfaction Measures, 14 INT’L J.
SERV. INDUSTRY MGMT. 96, 96 (2003).
67. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 239. See generally Elaine D. Pulakos
et al., Examination of Race and Sex Effects on Performance Ratings, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 770 (1989) (examining the effects of race and sex on performance evaluation ratings for first-term Army soldiers); Tim J. Wilkinson & Sylvie Fontaine, Patients’ Global Ratings of Student Competence: Unreliable
Contamination or Gold Standard, 36 MED. EDUC. 1117 (2002) (determining that
global ratings by medical patients are a valid and reliable assessment of medical
students’ clinical skills, but that this is achieved by controlling the context and
questions of surveys); David J. Woehr & Sylvia G. Roch, Context Effects in Performance Evaluation: The Impact of Ratee Gender and Performance Level on
Performance Ratings and Behavioral Recall, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 31 (1996) (finding significant differences in overall
performance ratings as a result of ratee sex and context factors).
68. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 240; see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Phillip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 255 (1999) (reviewing the impact of accountability on social judgments
and choices); Wendy L. Richman et al., A Meta-Analytic Study of Social Desirability Distortion in Computer-Administered Questionnaires, Traditional Questionnaires, and Interviews, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 754 (1999) (offering an analysis of social desirability distortions between computer, traditional paper-andpencil questionnaires, and face-to-face interviews).
69. Anna Breslaw, One Restaurant’s Unbelievable Response to a Sexist Customer Comment, COSMOPOLITAN (May 21, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/
food-cocktails/news/a25556/restaurant-more-skin-comment. In response to the
sexist feedback, the restaurant offered a seven-dollar potato skin special and
donated all proceeds to the West Virginia Foundation for Rape Information Services. Id.
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citizens.” 70 And in Cleveland, Ohio, a university dining hall
worker found a comment card that read, “There are a lot of black
people working here. I hope it’s just for Black History Month.
Signed, the KKK.” 71 While overtly discriminatory customer feedback typically is anonymous, that’s not always the case. For example, a father in Michigan told a hospital supervisor that he
did not want any black nurses caring for his baby; 72 a medical
center in Baltimore, Maryland, demanded that a security staffing company provide only male security guards; 73 and even the
federal government, by way of the National Security Agency, insisted that an IT contractor reassign an employee to another client for taking what it considered excessive leave to care for his
sick wife.74 Although instances of overt discrimination seem to
be less common in recent years, various commentators have expressed concern that blatant racism, sexism, and xenophobia
may become more commonplace under the Trump Administration.75
70. Cleve R. Wootson Jr., This Couple Didn’t Tip Their Latina Server. They
Left a Hateful Message Instead, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/08/21/this-couple-didnt-tip
-their-latina-server-they-left-a-hateful-message-instead.
71. Gabrielle Buffington, Graffiti and Prejudiced Remarks Found in Fribley
Commons Before Spring Break; Perpetrators Still Not Caught, OBSERVER (Mar.
26, 2015), http://observer.case.edu/graffiti-and-prejudiced-remarks-found-in
-fribley-commons-before-spring-break-perpetrators-still-not-caught.
72. Gary Ridley, Hurley Settles Race Discrimination Complaint That
Claimed Black Nurses Were Banned from Treating White Baby in Flint,
MLIVE.COM (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/
09/hurley_settles_race_discrimina.html.
73. Williams v. G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., No.ELH-10-3476, 2012 WL
1698282, at *2 (D. Md. May 11, 2012).
74. Sparenberg v. Eagle All., No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *2 (D.
Md. Oct. 15, 2015).
75. See, e.g., Laura Bates, Opinion, Trump’s Insults Embolden America’s
Secret Sexists, CNN (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/14/opinions/
trumps-insults-embolden-americas-secret-sexists-opinion-bates (“[Mr. Trump]
is emboldening all those who secretly hold these [sexist] views at every turn. If
he were elected, it would be a hugely powerful validation of these opinions and
would risk securing them in societal acceptability for generations to come.”);
Arun Gupta, How a Trump Presidency Would Unleash a Torrent of Racist Violence—and Devastate the Left, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www
.inthesetimes.com/features/trump_presidency_would_devastate_the_left.html
(warning that “a Trump victory would embolden white nationalists, giving them
access to vast state power and resources and a White House that would downplay or ignore their violent excesses”); What It’s Like to Be an American Muslim
After Trump’s Election, NPR (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/11/12/
501853599/what-its-like-to-be-an-american-muslim-after-trumps-election
(quoting human rights lawyer Arsalan Iftikhar as he explains that he is “quite
worried for the next four years when it comes to women and Hispanics and
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Although we have made “considerable progress in reducing
overt expressions of prejudice since the Civil Rights Movement
of the 1960s,” 76 this does not necessarily mean Americans are
becoming less discriminatory; more likely, discrimination is becoming harder to detect. Indeed, “there is abundant social-psychological evidence that biases against women and minorities
persist in a more covert and non-conscious form” 77—what researchers often term “modern discrimination,” 78 “aversive discrimination,” 79 “covert discrimination,” 80 or “implicit bias.” 81
Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio posit that as antidiscrimination ideals become more firmly entrenched in American
society, “many Whites who consciously, explicitly, and sincerely
support egalitarian principles and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced also harbor negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks
and other historically disadvantaged groups.” 82 They further explain that “The existence of both the conscious endorsement of
egalitarian values and unconscious negative feelings toward
Blacks makes aversive racists’ attitudes complex and produces a
distinct pattern of discriminatory behavior.” 83 Moreover,
LGBT folks and people with disabilities, African-Americans and, of course,
American Muslims, in terms of how this is going to affect their lives over the
next four years under a Trump presidency” because Mr. Trump “has emboldened an entire subset of the American populace who now think it’s OK to bring
Nazi flags to presidential rallies”).
76. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 240.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., V. Paul Poteat & Lisa B. Spanierman, Modern Racism Attitudes Among White Students: The Role of Dominance and Authoritarianism and
the Mediating Effects of Racial Color-Blindness, 152 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 758
(2012).
79. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding and
Addressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 615, 618 (2005).
80. See, e.g., Christopher L. Aberson et al., Covert Discrimination Against
Gay Men by U.S. College Students, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 323 (1999).
81. See, e.g., Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit
Bias to Advance Anti-Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1 (2015).
82. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 79; see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 903 (1993) (“[Survey
data shows] virtually all whites in American society now profess a commitment
to nondiscrimination in employment.” However, the data also reveals a “consistently high level of general racial prejudice,” signifying that “overt racism has
lost favor socially, but racist attitudes lie close beneath the surface of our society.”).
83. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 79, at 619; see also Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“ Traditional notions of intent do not reflect
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“Whereas old-fashioned racists exhibit a direct and overt pattern
of discrimination, aversive racists’ actions may appear more variable and inconsistent.” 84 Significantly, because aversive racists
consciously endorse egalitarian principles, “they will not discriminate in situations with strong social norms when discrimination would be obvious to others and to themselves.” 85 Instead,
these unconscious feelings are expressed in “subtle, indirect, and
rationalizable ways”—particularly “in situations in which normative structure is weak, when the guidelines for appropriate
behavior are vague, or when the basis for social judgment is ambiguous.” 86
Aversive discrimination often occurs when aversive racists
“can justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of
some factor other than race,” such that they are able to engage
in behaviors that harm a minority, “but in ways that allow them
to maintain their self-image as nonprejudiced.” 87 Customer feedback may be especially susceptible to this type of bias for the
very reasons Gaertner and Dovidio articulate: the normative
structure for feedback exchanges typically is weak or nonexistent, because feedback tends to be anonymous and raters face no
repercussions for their answers; the guidelines for appropriate
rater behavior are often vague; the basis for social judgment is
entirely ambiguous; and survey questions and other feedback
mechanisms provide ample opportunity for a respondent to give
an employee a poor rating ostensibly on the basis of some factor
other than the employee’s protected characteristic.
A growing body of research indicates customers both consciously and unconsciously allow racist and sexual biases to adversely affect their perceptions of service exchanges. David Hekman and colleagues conducted the most robust study on this
question, demonstrating how rater bias impacted customer satisfaction scores in three studies using different samples and
methods.88 The first study analyzed over twelve thousand patient satisfaction ratings and found that even after controlling
the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional—in the sense that certain
outcomes are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decision-maker ’s beliefs, desires, and wishes.”).
84. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 79, at 619.
85. Id. at 620.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Hekman et al., supra note 64.
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for objective measures of physician performance (productivity,
accessibility, and quality), female and nonwhite physicians received lower patient satisfaction scores than their male and
white counterparts. 89 In the second study, student raters observed videos of an employee-customer interaction in a university bookstore and were asked to evaluate the employee’s behavior and to provide satisfaction judgments of the store
environment.90 Different videos of the same scripted interaction
were shown, with the only variance being in the employee’s race
or sex.91 Importantly, each respondent also took two implicit association tests (IATs), so the researchers could examine how implicit biases impacted student rater evaluations. 92 The study
found that respondents rated employees and the organizational
context as worse when observing the performance of female and
nonwhite employees, especially if the respondent held implicit
biases about the low-status group.93 The third study, which examined member satisfaction at sixty-six country clubs, found
that objectively measured behaviors that benefitted members,
such as the quality of the facilities, were positively related to satisfaction, but only for facilities with low percentages of nonwhite
and female employees. 94 The findings from these three studies
led Hekman and colleagues to conclude:
If these results are replicated and generalizable, they have significant implications for organizational practice. If managers are serious
about the fair treatment of their employees and the promotion of diversity, they need to treat customer ratings differently. More specifically,
the rating process can be changed by increasing information, responsibility, or training for raters and by changing how customer ratings are
used. In the latter context, organizations can perhaps measure and discount such biases or statistically adjust the ratings to remove the bias.
Without such actions, given the increasing dependence on customer
ratings, society is not only likely to maintain existing levels of inequitable compensation and advancement for women and minorities, but
also likely to increase these inequities. This outcome is unacceptable in
a society that is committed legally, morally, and socially to fair treatment for all in the workplace. 95

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 243–49.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 250–53.
Id. at 253–56.
Id. at 259.
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Other researchers have found similar patterns of bias across
a variety of settings. For instance, Dan Moshavi found that customers rated their telephonic exchanges with customer-service
representatives significantly higher if the representative was
the opposite sex of the respondent. 96 An analysis of customer satisfaction scores from three hundred clients of an online-marketing firm found that all of the male client-service representatives
had higher scores than all of the female client-service representatives, even though the female marketers on average had higher
producing accounts.97 In fact, all of the men on staff had aboveaverage scores, while all women had below-average scores, and
the lowest scoring male representative had higher ratings than
the top scoring female representative.98 Lillian MacNell and colleagues detected a similar pattern of discrimination in students’
ratings of their professors on teaching evaluations.99 In that
study, assistant instructors in an online class each operated under two different gender identities. 100 Students rated the male
identity significantly higher than the female identity, regardless
of the instructor’s actual gender. 101 Tombs and Hill’s study of
customer reactions to different employee accents revealed that
while hearing a foreign accent was not enough on its own to influence customer ratings, when the employee was incompetent
or the customer was in a negative affective state, a foreign accent
seemed to exacerbate the situation. 102
Customer bias likewise manifests itself in the judicial world.
A 1993 study of over ten thousand Colorado attorneys’ ratings of
the judges before whom they had appeared in the prior eighteen
months found that female judges were rated significantly lower
than male judges on a number of different attributes. 103 One96. Dan Moshavi, He Said, She Said: Gender Bias and Customer Satisfaction with Phone-Based Service Encounters, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 162,
171 (2004).
97. See Bryce Covert, Female Client Service Reps Get Lower Scores Despite
Better Performance and Experience, THINKPROGRESS (May 22, 2014), https://
www.thinkprogress.org/female-client-service-reps-get-lower-scores-despite
-better-performance-and-experience-dfa457062f5c#.36ijmroyv.
98. Id.
99. See Lillian MacNell et al., What’s in a Name: Exposing Gender Bias in
Student Ratings of Teachings, 40 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 291, 301 (2015).
100. Id. at 296–97.
101. Id. at 301.
102. Alastair Tombs & Sally Rao Hill, The Effect of Service Employees’ Accent
on Customer Reactions, 48 EUR. J. MARKETING 2051, 2062–65 (2014).
103. Joyce S. Sterling, The Impact of Gender Bias on Judging: Survey of Attitudes Toward Women Judges, 22 COLO. LAW. 257, 257 (1993).
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fourth of the attorneys recommended the female judges not be
retained, whereas just thirteen percent recommended the male
judges not be retained. 104 Male attorneys ranked female judges
lower than male judges on every attribute measured. 105 Interestingly, female attorneys ranked female judges as high as male
judges on some attributes but significantly lower than male
judges on several others, including compassion, courtesy, satisfactory performance as a motions judge, satisfactory performance as a settlement judge, and overall rating.106 More than
two decades later, female judges still appear to be evaluated
more harshly because of their sex. Gill’s 2014 study of judicial
performance evaluations from Clark County, Nevada, found that
female and nonwhite judges were rated significantly lower by
attorneys, even after controlling for job performance. 107
Lastly, a number of studies have shown customers discriminate against black service employees in how much they tip
them—a different, perhaps more honest, form of feedback. Ian
Ayres and colleagues’ analysis of more than one thousand tips to
taxicab drivers in New Haven, Connecticut, found that black
drivers on average were tipped nearly one-third less than their
white counterparts and were also eighty percent more likely
than white drivers to receive no tip at all. 108 Michael Lynn and
colleagues’ examination of 140 tips given to restaurant workers
in a southern region of the United States showed that both white
and black diners tipped black servers less than white servers,
even after controlling for the diners’ rating of service. 109 Brewster and Lynn’s subsequent study of over five hundred restaurant diners in a northern U.S. city detected this same pattern of
discrimination against black servers.110
In short, there can be no doubt customer feedback plays a
vital role in today’s service economy. But its utility is often undermined both by serious methodological shortcomings in how
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Rebecca D. Gill, Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance Evaluations: We
Must Do Better Than This, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 289–91 (2014).
108. Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613, 1616 (2005).
109. Michael Lynn et al., Consumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping: A
Replication and Extension, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1045, 1054–55 (2008).
110. Zachary W. Brewster & Michael Lynn, Black-White Earnings Gap
Among Restaurant Servers: A Replication, Extension, and Exploration of Consumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping, 84 SOC. INQUIRY 545, 557–61 (2014).
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the data is collected and generated, as well as by conscious and
unconscious cognitive biases that skew customer ratings. Although the former is troubling in its own right, the latter is of
more serious concern, inasmuch as biased feedback can subject
employees to discrimination based on protected traits while also
exposing employers to costly litigation.
III. CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION WITHIN
EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
As other commentators have noted, the courts have not directly addressed employers’ use of discriminatory customer feedback. 111 That is not to say customer feedback discrimination is
not a serious problem. We know firms are soliciting feedback
from customers at unprecedented rates, that much of that feedback is either intentionally or unintentionally biased, and that
such feedback regularly factors into employment decisions. 112 So
then, why the dearth of lawsuits? I argue in this Part that the
answer lies, at least partially, in the difficulty of litigating customer feedback discrimination claims within existing legal
frameworks. Returning to our introductory hypothetical, Dr.
Flowers has two options for proving the medical clinic terminated her employment because of her sex. 113 She either must
prove disparate treatment (i.e., that the clinic’s discrimination
was intentional; its use of patient satisfaction ratings was pretext for discrimination) or disparate impact (i.e., that even if the
clinic’s decision was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on women). In this Part, I explain why the disparate treatment and disparate impact frameworks are unappealing and
may, in fact, deter victims of discrimination from pursuing their
claims. I further contend that these frameworks do not properly
incentivize employers to guard against customer feedback discrimination.

111. See Wang, supra note 4, at 285 (“While the use of customer feedback to
manage employees appears to be both widespread and problematic, it is not one
that employment discrimination law has yet addressed.”); Zatz, supra note 3, at
1417 (“No published decision is precisely on point . . . .”).
112. See supra Parts I, II.B.
113. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032
(2015) (explaining that disparate treatment and disparate impact “are the only
causes of action under Title VII”); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d
1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Under Title VII, discrimination can be demonstrated
through evidence of either ‘disparate treatment’ or ‘disparate impact.’”).
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A. DISPARATE TREATMENT
Discrimination that is intentional is analyzed under a disparate treatment theory of discrimination. 114 To prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must prove her employer discriminated against her “because of” a protected trait. 115 The
protected trait need not be the sole reason for the termination;
alternatively, a plaintiff can prevail by showing the protected
trait “was a motivating factor” in the employment decision. 116
How a plaintiff goes about proving disparate treatment depends
on the type of evidence she possesses to support her claim. A
plaintiff can prove disparate treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence.117 “Direct evidence of discrimination is ‘evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact [in
issue] without inference or presumption.’” 118 Direct evidence requires a statement of discriminatory intent by a person involved
in the adverse action, such as “a woman was not competent
enough to do this job” or “we can’t have women in management.” 119
Because direct evidence of discrimination is rare, 120 plaintiffs ordinarily attempt to prove their claims through circumstantial evidence, using a three-part burden shifting analysis
known as the McDonnell Douglas test. 121 This analytical model,
114. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining that intentional discrimination is known as disparate treatment).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
116. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
117. See Presley v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 675 F. App’x 507, 512 (6th
Cir. 2017) (“ To establish a discrimination claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must
present either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination . . . .”).
118. Horne v. Turner Constr. Co., 136 F. App’x 289, 292 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990));
see also McNulty v. Citadel Broad. Co., 58 F. App’x 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Direct evidence means ‘evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the “decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on [the plaintiff ’s age] in
reaching their decision to fire him.”’” (quoting Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d
335, 337–38 (3d Cir. 2002))).
119. Horne, 136 F. App’x at 292.
120. See Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Direct evidence—
an overt admission of discriminatory intent—is rare . . . .”); Sardina v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F. App’x 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[D]irect evidence of
discriminatory intent is rare and such intent often must be inferred from circumstantial evidence . . . .”).
121. See Sullivan v. Worley Catastrophe Servs., L.L.C., 591 F. App’x 243,
245–46 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Since ‘direct evidence of discrimination is rare, the Supreme Court has devised an evidentiary procedure that allocates the burden of
production and establishes an orderly presentation of proof in discrimination
cases.’” (quoting Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir.
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announced by the Supreme Court in 1973, 122 involves three distinct steps: (1) the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
of discrimination; (2) the defendant employer must then offer a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action; whereafter (3) the plaintiff must show the employer’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. 123 In
mixed-motive cases, there is often a fourth step: “If a plaintiff
demonstrates that [the protected trait] was a motivating factor
in the employment decision, it then falls to the defendant to
prove ‘that the same adverse employment decision would have
been made regardless of discriminatory animus.’” 124 Whereas
the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas test are
fairly straightforward, “[t]he proof necessary to establish a
prima facie case . . . is flexible and varies with the specific facts
of each case.” 125 In a discriminatory discharge case such as Dr.
Flowers’s, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case generally
by showing that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was
performing her duties satisfactorily; (3) she was discharged; and
(4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. 126
Although the courts have made clear that disparate treatment must be intentional on the employer’s part,127 neither the
1996))); EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002) (“ The
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework using circumstantial evidence has developed because direct evidence of discrimination is rare.”).
122. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–04 (1973).
123. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49–50 n.3 (2003) (“Under
McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If the employer meets this
burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the
plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence
demonstrating that the employer ’s explanation is pretextual.” (internal citation
omitted)).
124. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C.
2003)).
125. Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2001);
see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (stating that
McDonnell Douglas created a flexible standard for plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination that may be modified to fit the facts of a case).
126. See Grant v. City of Blytheville, 841 F.3d 767, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2016);
Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014); Barlow v. C.R.
Eng., Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 505 (10th Cir. 2012).
127. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“ To prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of
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language of Title VII nor the McDonnell Douglas test explicitly
requires a showing of intentionality. Whether and how a plaintiff
must show an employer intentionally discriminated is crucial in
the context of customer feedback discrimination. If an employer
could only be liable for disparate treatment if it consciously factors biased feedback into an employment decision, the employer
would have to actually know the feedback was biased and decide
to use it anyway. Thus the employer could avoid liability, and
freely use feedback that is just as prejudicial to an employee, so
long as the bias is implicit or otherwise unknown to the employer. Deborah Brake rightly asserts that uncertainty about
whether disparate treatment must be conscious to be intentional
stems from ambiguity in the statutory text itself, which simply
prohibits discrimination “because of” 128 or motivated by 129 a protected trait:
The statute could plausibly be read [as permitting disparate treatment
claims based on unconscious discrimination]. Nowhere does the text
limit the statute’s reach to intentionally biased decision making in codifying the unlawful employment practices. Rather, the statutory language simply bars employers from discriminating “because of such individual’s” race or sex. If “because of ” denotes causation-in-fact, an
employment decision that is made based in whole or in part on the employee’s sex or race would violate the statute regardless of whether the
actor deliberately relied on the discriminatory reason, as long as that
is in fact what occurred.
And yet, this is not the only plausible reading of the statutory text.
An alternative reading is that the term “discriminate” . . . implicitly
incorporates a requirement that the decision maker acted intentionally, so that discrimination is understood to involve the actor ’s conscious awareness of the reason for the decision. 130

While scholars are somewhat divided over whether disparate treatment reaches implicit bias, 131 I agree with Brake that
a protected characteristic.”); Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 112 (1st
Cir. 2015) (“ To successfully establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, [the
plaintiff ] must show that he suffered intentional discrimination.”); HDC, LLC
v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2012) (“ To prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show proof of intentional discrimination.”);
Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 699–700 (1st Cir. 1999) (“ The linchpin of
a disparate treatment claim is proof of the employer ’s discriminatory motive.
Not so a claim of disparate impact . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
129. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
130. Deborah Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination:
From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay,
105 GEO. L.J. 559, 571 (2017).
131. Compare Christopher Cerullo, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 155–61 (2013), Melissa
Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L.
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the courts appear to be “increasingly wedded to a conception of
the disparate treatment claim as predicated on the decision
maker’s conscious reliance on a discriminatory reason.” 132 This
is evident from courts’ repeated assertion that disparate treatment claims involve intentional discrimination, whereas disparate impact involves unintentional discrimination. 133 Additionally, the Supreme Court itself insinuated, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, that an employer intentionally discriminates only if it
acts with a conscious discriminatory intent or motive:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response,
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a
woman. 134

The Court’s reasoning suggests that whether an employer intentionally discriminates depends on if the employer knows at the
time of the employment decision that a protected trait motivated
the action. Thus, if the employment decision had been unconsciously motivated by the protected trait, the employer could not
have intentionally discriminated. More recently, as Brake points
out, the Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

REV. 741, 757, 771 (2005), Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1237 (1999), and
Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67,
100–01 (2010), with Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129,
1146–49 (1999) (arguing that the current doctrine is formally at odds with liability for unconscious forms of disparate treatment).
132. Brake, supra note 130, at 572; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (1995) (arguing
that, in disparate treatment cases, “liability is premised on the presence of conscious discriminatory animus”).
133. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2002) (referring to intentional discrimination as disparate treatment and
unintentional discrimination as disparate impact); Tyler v. City of Manhattan,
118 F.3d 1400, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts have found it useful to distinguish between intentional discrimination, often labeled as ‘disparate treatment,’ and unintentional or incidental discrimination, labeled as ‘disparate impact.’”); Brown v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (D.
Minn. 2010) (“[D]isparate treatment involves intentional discrimination against
an individual (or group of individuals), while disparate impact involves unintentional discrimination.”); Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“ The issue before this Court is
whether claims of disparate impact (unintentional), as well as disparate treatment (intentional), discrimination are barred from coverage . . . .”).
134. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (emphasis added).
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“equated pay discrimination with the employer’s deliberate decision to pay a woman less because of her sex,” and in Wal-mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes the Court expressed “skepticism of the
plaintiffs’ assertion [that] a common policy of discrimination was
fueled by an implicit understanding of discrimination as a conscious, and thereby rare, phenomenon.” 135 Brake further contends that even though the Court did not make intentionality an
explicit element of the McDonnell Douglas test, the test itself “is
predicated on a working assumption that the employer knew regardless of whether it relied on a discriminatory reason.” 136 This
assumption is evidenced by the fact that “proof of the falsity of
the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason supports
an inference of discrimination because it supports an inference
that the employer knowingly lied to cover up its real (and by implication, deliberate) discriminatory reason.”137
Either interpretation of the statutory text seems anathema
to properly allocating liability for employment decisions based
on biased customer feedback. On the one hand, if Title VII only
prohibits intentional discrimination that is conscious, this would
seem to foreclose the possibility of an employer being liable for
using anything other than the most explicitly and obviously discriminatory customer feedback. This seems contrary to Title
VII’s plain intent. 138 What incentive would an employer have to
carefully scrutinize feedback for bias if ignorance is bliss? Indeed, what would keep an employer from relying exclusively on
quantitative customer feedback, from which bias cannot be easily ascertained, as a way to insulate itself from liability? On the
other hand, a broad reading of Title VII that would subject employers to liability for the slightest trace of implicit bias in a single customer satisfaction survey seems heavy handed, unrealistic, and overly punitive. Can it really be said that an employer
intentionally discriminates when it factors into an employment
135. Brake, supra note 130, at 571–72.
136. Id. at 572–73.
137. Id.
138. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (“ The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, through
the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin.”); 110 CONG. REC.
13,079–80 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark) (similar); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“ The language of Title VII makes
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
. . . stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”).
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decision facially neutral feedback that is tainted by hidden bias
that only a skilled social scientist could detect?
To understand how courts might analyze customer feedback
discrimination claims under a disparate treatment framework,
it is helpful to divide such claims into three categories: (1) claims
in which the bias is intentional and known to the employer;
(2) claims in which bias is intentional but unknown to the employer; and (3) claims in which bias is unintentional and unknown to the employer.
1. Intentional and Known Bias
The case law is most helpful in predicting how a court would
analyze a customer feedback discrimination claim where the
feedback is intentionally biased and the employer is aware of the
bias but uses the feedback anyway. It seems clear that in such
cases the employer could—and should—be liable. Customer preference cases are instructive, if not perfectly analogous, in this
regard. These cases typically involve customer requests or demands that would require an employer to discriminate against
its workforce; in turn, the employer acquiesces to keep the customer happy. 139 What makes these cases intellectually interesting is that, as with customer feedback discrimination, it is the
customer, not the employer, who possesses the discriminatory
animus. Even so, the courts have been clear that this does not
exculpate the employer from liability in most instances. For example, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit held that Pan Am’s policy of hiring only women as flight
attendants because its passengers “overwhelmingly preferred to
be served by female stewardesses” constituted impermissible
discrimination under Title VII. 140 The court explained that although its decision “may cause some initial difficulty” for the airline, “it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether
the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.” 141
The Diaz court was not alone in holding an employer liable
for catering to customers’ discriminatory preferences. In Chaney
139. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir.
2010); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Williams v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., No. ELH-10-3476, 2012 WL 1698282
(D. Md. May 11, 2012).
140. 442 F.2d at 387–89.
141. Id. at 389.
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v. Plainfield Healthcare Center, the Seventh Circuit reversed
summary judgment for a nursing home that assigned a black
employee different job duties because certain residents refused
to be treated by black nurses.142 In so doing, the court declared,
“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the
perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for treating employees differently based on race.” 143
In Silver v. North Shore University Hospital, the district court
denied summary judgment to a hospital that terminated a fiftynine-year-old scientist based on its perception that outside
sources would not give funding to older employees.144 In Olsen v.
Marriott International, Inc., the district court denied Marriott
summary judgment on a claim that it unlawfully refused to hire
a male massage therapist based on its clientele’s preference for
females. 145 And in Hylind v. Xerox Corp., the district court denied summary judgment to an employer accused of assigning a
female employee to a less desirable sales account because it believed the client was attracted to her. 146
The courts have stopped short of declaring that discriminatory customer preferences can never legally factor into employment decisions. Employers have found modest success in cases
where customers’ discriminatory preferences were rooted in privacy 147 or safety 148 concerns. For instance, in Wade v. Napolitano, the district court granted summary judgment to the Transportation Security Administration on a claim that it engaged in
142. 612 F.3d at 912–15.
143. Id. at 913.
144. 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
145. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063–68 (D. Ariz. 1999).
146. 380 F. Supp. 2d 705, 716–18 (D. Md. 2005), aff ’d, 481 F. App’x 819 (4th
Cir. 2012).
147. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir.
1996) (childcare specialists); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.
Miss. 1987) (catheterization and other intimate services provided to male patients by nurse’s aides); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (washroom attendants); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537
F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (janitors cleaning bathhouses and restrooms); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 671 F.2d. 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (nurses in obstetrics unit
of hospital where intimate procedures performed and female body and genitalia
routinely exposed).
148. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding a policy prohibiting pregnant flight attendants from working on
flights because of the safety concerns created for passengers if pregnant flight
attendants could not properly perform their roles in emergency situations); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
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sex discrimination by requiring that one-third of its screeners be
female.149 The court found sex to constitute a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), and therefore a complete defense to
the discrimination claim, after customer satisfaction surveys
revealed that the same-gender screening procedures met the public’s
expectations . . . [while] further[ing] TSA’s ultimate objective of providing security as the TSA found that if passengers are more comfortable
with how searches are conducted, then they are less likely to object and
more likely to comply with pat-down requests. 150

Similarly, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court upheld
Alabama’s creation of gender-specific positions in its prison system because maintaining prison security is the essence of a correction officer’s job and prisoners—a different type of customer—were entitled to feel safe. 151 Outside the privacy and
safety contexts, there may also be room within the law for employers to discriminate based on customers’ preference for genuineness, such as a woman playing Cinderella in a play.152
Customer preference cases provide a useful model for how
courts should analyze customer feedback discrimination claims
involving feedback the customer intended, and the employer
149. Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3-07-0892, 2009 WL 9071049, at *1–2 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 24, 2009).
150. Id. at *9.
151. 433 U.S. 321, 332–37 (1977).
152. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2016) (recognizing sex as a BFOQ where authenticity or genuineness is at issue). The courts tend to agree that in limited
circumstances an employer is permitted to discriminate where gender-based authenticity is at issue. See, e.g., St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Inc., Appeal No. 773,
Case No. CSF 22618-70 (N.Y. Human Rights App. Bd. 1971) (finding being female a BFOQ for the position of a Playboy Bunny because female sexuality is
reasonably necessary to perform the dominant purpose of the job, which is to
titillate and entice male customers). They likewise have acknowledged the possibility of race- and national-origin-based authenticity discrimination. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650, 653–54 (5th Cir. 1980)
(questioning whether race might in fact constitute a BFOQ in certain situations,
such as a black actor portraying George Wallace or a white actor portraying
Martin Luther King Jr.); Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262,
1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (suggesting, without holding, that the authenticity exception would give rise to a BFOQ for Chinese nationality where necessary to maintain the authentic atmosphere of an ethnic Chinese restaurant); see also Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473,
525 (2001) (“Although courts are willing to recognize an authenticity justification for BFOQs, the fact that Congress intentionally elected not to enact a BFOQ
for race or color prevents courts from judicially creating one even to protect the
authenticity of theatrical productions.”). But see EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312–13 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting argument that hiring
only male servers was necessary to create an “Old World” ambience modeled
after the highest-quality restaurants in Europe).
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knew, to be biased. In general, an employer would be prohibited
from using tainted feedback for the same reason the courts prohibit employers from acquiescing to customers’ discriminatory
demands: it runs counter to Title VII’s goal of eradicating discrimination from the workplace. 153 As with customer preference
cases, there may be some room to allow employers to discriminate where biased customer feedback is tied to privacy, safety,
or authenticity concerns. For instance, a playhouse might be entitled to recast the role of Ray Charles as a black man if patrons
left comment cards expressing outrage that a white man was
given the part, or a women’s gym could hire only female trainers
if members complained that having male trainers violated their
privacy.
2. Intentional but Unknown Bias
It is more difficult to predict how a court would address a
situation in which customers intend for their feedback to be biased, but the bias is unknown to the employer who then uses it
to make employment decisions. The customer preference cases
are unhelpful in answering this question because, at least so far,
they involve only blatantly prejudicial customer requests that
the employers knew were discriminatory. If an employer is unaware that feedback is biased, does this foreclose the possibility
of the discrimination being intentional? Or might a court impose
some sort of duty on the employer to make itself aware (and
therefore conscious) that the feedback was biased? If so, how far
would that duty extend? Suppose Dr. Flowers’s patient feedback
included both quantitative and qualitative components. The
quantitative component consisted strictly of numerical scores,
but the qualitative component included sexist comments about
Dr. Flowers from several patients. If the clinic only looked at the
quantitative data, which showed no obvious signs of bias, but
forgot to review the qualitative data (which surely would have
tipped the clinic off that several respondents were sexist), would
the clinic’s discrimination still be unintentional? What if the
clinic purposely chose not to examine the patients’ comments because it was afraid of what it might find? Because unconscious

153. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254–55 (1994) (“ Title
VII’s ‘central statutory purposes [are] eradicating discrimination throughout
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination’ . . . .” (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975))).
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discrimination claims are almost always brought under a disparate impact theory, 154 the case law offers virtually no guidance as
to whether an employer has a duty to make itself conscious of
discriminatory customer feedback in the disparate treatment
context. The negligence framework I propose in Part IV seeks to
remedy this deficiency.
Setting aside the question of whether an employer has a
duty to make itself conscious of discriminatory feedback, there
may be an alternative ground for a court to determine whether
the employer intentionally discriminated despite its lack of
knowledge that the feedback was biased. Under the cat’s paw
theory of liability, “an employer may be liable for employment
discrimination if the source of illegal animus was not the final
employment decision-maker but rather another employee whose
animus proximately caused the adverse employment action.” 155
Although not perfectly analogous, cat’s paw discrimination is
factually similar to a situation in which an employer unintentionally discriminates based on intentionally biased customer
feedback. Both scenarios involve unsuspecting ultimate decision-makers who bear no animus themselves, yet nonetheless
permit others’ intentionally discriminatory feedback to affect the
employment decision.
The Supreme Court’s analysis of cat’s paw discrimination in
Staub v. Proctor Hospital is helpful in thinking about how courts
might approach a claim involving customer feedback in which
the bias is intentional but unknown to the employer. 156 Vincent
Staub claimed his termination was motivated by his employer’s
154. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 6115, 2016 WL
4618969, at *1–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2016) (explaining that certain facially neutral employment practices “can cause a disparate impact through favoritism or
unconscious racism or any number of other behaviors that are not intentionally
discriminatory”); Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1362
(D.N.J. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs’ claim that subjective decision-making
procedures resulted “in both conscious and unconscious discrimination is a disparate impact claim and not a pattern-or-practice claim”).
155. Mason v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 134 F. Supp. 3d 868, 874 (E.D. Pa.
2015); see also McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2011). Judge
Posner was the first to refer to subordinate bias liability as the cat’s paw doctrine. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). The term
derives from Jean LaFontaine’s fable, The Monkey and the Cat, “in which a
monkey convinces a gullible cat to pull chestnuts from a hot fire. The cat
snatches them from the fire, each time burning its paw, only to find that the
monkey has eaten all of the chestnuts.” Sara Atherton Mason, Cat’s Paw Cases:
The Standard for Assessing Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 435, 436 (2011).
156. 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
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hostility to his obligations as a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, which required him to devote a certain number of days
each year to training. 157 He alleged that although the vice president of human resources, who lacked such hostility, made the
decision to terminate him, her decision was influenced by his supervisors, who were perturbed by his military obligations. 158 The
Court began by noting that disparate treatment is an intentional
tort, which “generally require[s] that the actor intend ‘the consequences[] of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’” 159 It then questioned whether the discriminatory motive of a subordinate employee can be aggregated with the act of a decision-maker,
ultimately concluding that because the law requires only that
the protected trait be a motivating factor in the employment decision, “[s]o long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons,
that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be
liable under [antidiscrimination laws].” 160 The Court further
reasoned that “it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of
judgment by the decision-maker does not prevent the earlier
agent’s action (and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from being the proximate cause of the harm.” 161 Nor could
the decision-maker’s judgment be deemed a superseding cause
of the harm, the Court noted, because a cause is superseding
“only if it is a ‘cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.’” 162
In rejecting the employer’s position that an employer can
only be liable if the de facto decision-maker possesses discriminatory animus, the Court explained:
[T]he approach urged upon us by Proctor gives an unlikely meaning to
a provision designed to prevent employer discrimination. An employer ’s authority to reward, punish, or dismiss is often allocated
among multiple agents. The one who makes the ultimate decision does
so on the basis of performance assessments by other supervisors. Proctor ’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an employer
isolates a personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the
decision to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks
that official to review the employee’s personnel file before taking the
adverse action, then the employer will be effectively shielded from dis-

157. Id. at 413–14.
158. Id. at 415.
159. Id. at 417 (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998)).
160. Id. at 417–19.
161. Id. at 419.
162. Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837
(1996)).
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criminatory acts and recommendations of supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the adverse action. That seems to us
an implausible meaning of the text, and one that is not compelled by
its words. 163

Two important principles emerge from Staub. First, because
disparate treatment is a kind of intentional tort (or at least
equivalent thereto), an unsuspecting employer can only be liable
if the subordinate actor intends, for discriminatory reasons, to
cause the adverse action. Thus, even if customer bias is not obvious to the employer, it could still be liable if the customer gives
feedback intended to get an employee demoted or fired for discriminatory reasons. One problem with this, of course, is that it
would be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove a customer’s
discriminatory motive, particularly if the feedback was solely
quantitative or given anonymously. But the more pressing concern is that some, if not most, discriminatory feedback results
from implicit bias; as such, a plaintiff would be hard pressed to
argue that an implicitly biased customer gave feedback that was
“designed and intended” for discriminatory reasons to produce
the adverse action. It seems, then, that the cat’s paw principle
might be of some use in expanding liability to scenarios in which
employers are unaware of the bias, yet a plaintiff is able to prove
the customer consciously gave prejudicial feedback with the intent of causing an adverse action.
The other relevant principle from Staub is that cat’s paw liability is premised on an agency relationship between the employer and the subordinate actor. The reason cat’s paw liability
works is because the subordinate actor whose animus motivates
the employment decision is an employee, and thus an agent, of
the employer. For some commentators, the requirement of an
agency relationship renders the cat’s paw theory untenable in
cases where the discriminator is a nonemployee. 164 But this position overlooks the reality that when an employer factors customer feedback into an employment decision, it has made the
customer a pseudoagent. Einat Albin persuasively argues the
law should rethink discrimination liability in light of the fact
that, as employers become more reliant on feedback from customers, they grant those customers more sway over employing
functions that were once reserved exclusively to management,
163. Id. at 420.
164. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 4, at 259 (“But Staub’s seeming expansion
of the employer ’s liability beyond the discrimination of the ultimate decision
maker is limited by its terms to discrimination by those who occupy the narrow
category of supervisor within the employer-employee dyad . . . .”).
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such as hiring, firing, and compensation. 165 Lu-in Wang similarly reasons that “[t]his participation makes the customer simultaneously and paradoxically both a ‘partial employee’ of the
firm and . . . a second ‘boss’ to the worker.” 166 When an employer
relies on a customer’s feedback to make an employment decision,
the employer has effectively outsourced some of its decisionmaking authority to the customer. The customer becomes an
agent of the employer in the sense that the employer has empowered the customer to influence, if not altogether make, employment decisions. But even if courts are reticent to deem the employer-customer relationship one of agency, perhaps the cat’s
paw doctrine could be extended by arguing there is no appreciable difference between a decision-maker relying on a subordinate
employee’s tainted disciplinary action, as was the case in Staub,
and reliance on a customer’s tainted feedback, since both the
subordinate employee’s disciplinary action and the customer’s
feedback were intended, for discriminatory reasons, to cause the
adverse action.
3. Unintentional and Unknown Bias

Under current interpretations of disparate treatment law, a
victim of customer feedback discrimination would be least likely
to prevail in situations where the customers did not intend to
discriminate and the employer did not know their feedback was
biased. The case law offers precious little guidance on this category of claims, which is unfortunate because unintentional and
unknown bias is a very common type of customer feedback discrimination. Evidentiary challenges aside, the biggest problem
with feedback in which bias is unintentional and unknown is the
complete absence of intentionality by either the customer or the
employer. If neither the customer nor the employer knows the
feedback is biased, then under the Price Waterhouse test the employer truthfully would deny that at the moment of the decision
the protected trait motivated the employment decision.167
Still, the fact that customer bias may be unintentional and
unknown does not make it any less true that the employee was
discriminated against based on a protected trait. In reality,
whether Dr. Flowers’s patients realized they rated her lower because of their implicit biases, and whether the clinic knew the
ratings were biased, are irrelevant in the sense that neither fact
165. See Albin, supra note 45, at 186–90.
166. Wang, supra note 4, at 264–65 (internal citations omitted).
167. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
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has any bearing on whether Dr. Flowers was terminated because
of her sex (or, alternatively, that her sex motivated the employment decision). Although the growing consensus among the
courts seems to be that a claim of unknowing discrimination
such as this must be brought under the disparate impact framework, 168 there may yet be room within the disparate treatment
framework to plausibly argue that the clinic intentionally discriminated even though the bias was unintentional on the patients’ part and unknown to the clinic.
In Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., the First Circuit provided
a roadmap for how a plaintiff may prove an employer intentionally discriminated even when the intermediary actor, as well as
the employer itself, were unaware of the discrimination. 169 Myrtle Thomas claimed she was terminated based on a series of racially biased performance appraisals from her supervisor. 170
Thomas lost her job under circumstances similar to Dr. Flowers:
Kodak decided to reduce its workforce by terminating employees
with the lowest performance review scores over the past three
years.171 The district court granted Kodak summary judgment,
in part because Thomas failed to link her low scores to her
race. 172 Significantly, in reversing the lower court, the First Circuit noted that “Title VII’s prohibition against ‘disparate treatment because of race’ extends to both employer acts based on
conscious racial animus and to employer decisions that are based
on stereotyped thinking or other forms of less conscious bias.” 173
The court pointed out that Thomas’s claim was different “than
the type often used to exemplify the operation of the McDonnell
Douglas . . . framework” insofar as it alleged “a more subtle type
of disparate treatment” by challenging the neutrality of the performance review system—an argument that is typically reserved
for disparate impact cases—as opposed to claiming her employer
had articulated a false reason for her layoff. 174 The court rejected
the notion that Thomas had to prove the ratings were consciously biased, reasoning that “[t]he ultimate question is
whether the employee has been treated disparately ‘because of
race.’ This is so regardless of whether the employer consciously
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See cases cited supra note 133.
183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
Id. at 58.
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intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias.” 175 The court supported
this proposition by citing a portion of the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning
in Price Waterhouse—which the Supreme Court left undisturbed—wherein the appellate court declared:
unwitting or ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradication
than blatant or calculated discrimination . . . . [T]he fact that some or
all of the partners at Price Waterhouse may have been unaware of that
motivation, even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its existence nor excuses it. 176

In the First Circuit’s view, Thomas’s inability to prove her supervisor’s ratings were consciously biased did not preclude the
possibility of disparate treatment. Instead, less conscious—but
equally pernicious—bias could be inferred from other facts, including that Thomas’s scores sharply declined after she was
given a new supervisor and that the new supervisor had rated
Thomas lower than the white employees whom she evaluated. 177
It did not matter to the Thomas court whether either the
employer or the author of the performance reviews was consciously aware that the data was biased. Thomas survived summary judgment by presenting enough evidence to create a fact
issue as to whether the ratings were in fact biased. In Dr. Flowers’s case, if the court accepted the proposition that a plaintiff
can establish disparate treatment without showing the employer
consciously discriminated, she could at least theoretically prevail by proving the ratings themselves were discriminatory, regardless of whether the patients intended to discriminate or
whether the clinic knew the feedback was biased. The problem,
of course, is that proving the ratings were actually biased would
be extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible. Unlike
Thomas, who created an inference of implicit bias based on evidence that she had received higher ratings from a previous supervisor and that her current supervisor rated her lower than
the white employees whom she supervised, Dr. Flowers would
have to rely on far less concrete evidence. Patients who gave Dr.
Flowers low ratings could not testify that their implicit biases
influenced their ratings; by definition, an implicit bias is unknown to the actor. 178 Nor would a comparison of Dr. Flowers’s
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 60 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 469 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
177. Id. at 62–63.
178. Cerullo, supra note 131, at 139.
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ratings to other doctors’ scores be fruitful, since different patients rated each doctor. Perhaps Dr. Flowers’s best option would
be to have a social scientist run sophisticated statistical models
to attempt to detect implicit bias. However, because such an
analysis would be extremely sensitive to confounding variables,
the clinic’s patient-satisfaction questionnaire would have to be
sufficiently refined to allow a statistician to isolate implicit
bias—a longshot by almost any measure.
In sum, there is tremendous uncertainty surrounding the
use of a disparate treatment framework to prove customer feedback discrimination. The framework likely would work in cases
where bias is explicit and known to the employer, similar to customer preference cases. But in cases where the bias is unknown
to the employer, the framework would be much less likely to support a customer feedback discrimination claim unless a court
were willing to extend cat’s paw principles to cases of intentional
but unknown bias, or, in cases of unintentional and unknown
bias, a plaintiff could somehow prove the ratings were actually
biased. These possibilities notwithstanding, victims of customer
feedback discrimination face tremendously long odds in prevailing under the disparate treatment framework.
B. DISPARATE IMPACT
Nearly all cases of unintentional discrimination are analyzed under the disparate impact framework. 179 Although the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not expressly prohibit employment
policies or practices that produce a disparate impact, the Supreme Court recognized such a prohibition in the landmark case
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., wherein it interpreted the Act to
prohibit certain facially neutral employment practices that, in
fact, were “discriminatory in operation.” 180 Two decades later,
Congress codified the disparate impact doctrine as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 181 Under the statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing an employer uses “a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 182 An
179. See cases cited supra note 133.
180. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Griggs “has been universally hailed as the
most important development in employment discrimination law.” Michael
Selmi, Was Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 703
(2006) [hereinafter Selmi, Disparate Impact].
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012).
182. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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employer may defend against liability by demonstrating the
practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity.” 183 If the employer meets this burden, a
plaintiff may still succeed by showing the employer refuses to
adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less
disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs. 184
At least in theory, claims of unintentional discrimination are
well suited for the disparate impact framework because a court’s
sole focus is on the effect of an employment practice—not the
employer’s intent. 185
Although there were no published decisions by the end of
2017 involving allegations that customer feedback resulted in
disparate impact, plaintiffs have used this framework in claiming other types of subjective evaluations (typically supervisorgenerated performance reviews) disproportionately impacted a
protected group. For instance, Microsoft is currently embroiled
in a massive class action discrimination lawsuit in which the
plaintiffs claim Microsoft’s procedure for evaluating performance “systematically undervalues female technical employees
relative to their male peers.” 186 Pittsburgh Glass Works likewise
has been involved in litigation for more than seven years over
claims its subjective evaluation process led to a disproportionate
number of older workers being laid off. 187 In challenging these
policies, the plaintiffs need only prove the discriminatory effect
of such policies rather than a discriminatory motive. 188
At first blush, disparate impact may seem like the ideal
framework in which to prove customer feedback discrimination,
particularly in cases where discriminatory animus on the employer’s part is lacking. However, a closer examination of the
theory reveals multiple drawbacks that render this framework
much less enticing, if not altogether infeasible. For instance, un183. Id.
184. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
185. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015) (“In
evaluating a disparate-impact claim, courts focus on the effects of an employment practice, determining whether they are unlawful irrespective of motivation or intent.”).
186. Class Action Complaint at ¶ 24, Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No.
2:15-cv-01483 (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 16, 2015), 2015 WL 5460411.
187. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 66 (3d Cir.
2017).
188. See Hill v. Miss. State Emp’t Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that disparate treatment focuses on discriminatory motive, whereas
disparate impact concentrates on discriminatory effect).
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like with disparate treatment claims, Title VII forbids compensatory and punitive damages for disparate impact claims, 189 automatically making such claims less attractive for many plaintiffs and their attorneys. 190 Although the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) does not differentiate between the
types of damages available to victims of disparate treatment and
disparate impact age discrimination, liquidated damages are
available only upon proof of willfulness, which of course tends to
be extremely difficult to prove in disparate impact cases.191
Not only are damages in disparate impact cases more limited, but the cases themselves are harder to win. 192 Michael
Selmi’s analysis of three decades worth of disparate impact cases
revealed that plaintiffs prevailed at the appellate level in only
19.2% of cases (the majority of which were remands rather than
outright victories) and at the district court level in 25.1% of cases
(many of which involved simply surviving summary judgment). 193 By contrast, the win rate for plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases more generally stands around 35%. 194
Selmi attributes the lack of success by disparate impact plaintiffs not to any inherent difficulty in establishing that a practice
or policy disparately impacts a particular group, but rather in
courts’ hesitance to seriously question an employer’s defense

189. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n,
527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999) (“[Title VII] limits compensatory and punitive damages
awards, however, to cases of ‘intentional discrimination’—that is, cases that do
not rely on the ‘disparate impact’ theory of discrimination.”).
190. See Selmi, Disparate Impact, supra note 180, at 735 (“Undoubtedly, the
addition of damages for intentional discrimination claims . . . while withholding
them from disparate impact claims, has substantially altered the incentives for
defining claims as intentional discrimination.”); Sandra F. Sperino, Disparate
Impact or Negative Impact?: The Future of Non-Intentional Discrimination
Claims Brought by the Elderly, 13 ELDER L.J. 339, 363 (2005) [hereinafter
Sperino, Disparate Impact] (explaining that the prohibition on compensatory
and punitive damages in disparate impact cases “provides little incentive for
private attorneys to pursue disparate impact claims, compared to the types of
damages available under a disparate treatment cause of action”).
191. See Sperino, Disparate Impact, supra note 190, at 363.
192. See Selmi, Disparate Impact, supra note 180, at 706 (“[T]he reality has
been that disparate impact claims are more difficult—not easier—to prove than
claims of intentional discrimination.”).
193. Id. at 738–39.
194. Id. at 739.
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that the practice or policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity.195 He explains that “courts routinely defer to employer practices in making those judgments . . . because courts
typically are reluctant to identify ambiguous behavior as discriminatory.” 196
Selmi’s analysis exposes another troubling truth about disparate impact claims. The disparate impact framework initially
was constructed to combat discrimination in seniority systems
and written tests, and “[a]lthough courts have never restricted
the theory to those particular contexts, the reality has been that
the theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to
written examinations.” 197 Selmi found this to be especially true
of cases involving subjective employment practices, which certainly would include customer feedback-based employment decisions, noting that “these claims have been almost uniformly unsuccessful” and that “the reality is that subjective employment
practices are almost always more successful as intentional discrimination claims.” 198 Selmi suggests this is because a court
that would not see intentional discrimination amidst circumstantial evidence “would have an equally hard time identifying
discrimination based on adverse effects that were, by definition,
unintentional. Even if statistical disparate impact could be
shown, the court would likely accept the employer’s practices as
justified, just as it found the employer’s practice nondiscriminatory.” 199 Based on Selmi’s analysis, not only would a customerfeedback-based disparate impact claim be harder to prove than
other disparate impact claims, but it would also be more difficult
to prove than if the claim were brought under the disparate
treatment framework.
Selmi’s point about judicial deference to employers has the
potential to be especially true of customer feedback discrimination. One can easily envision a scenario in which an employer
defends itself from a disparate impact customer feedback discrimination claim by arguing that reliance on customer feedback
to make employment decisions constitutes a business necessity,
195. Id. at 749 (“ The expectation that these claims would be easier to establish than intentional discrimination claims rests entirely on the first part of the
theory regarding the prima facie case of discrimination, but ignores the business
necessity prong, which has always proved the greater hurdle.”).
196. Id. at 769.
197. Id. at 705.
198. Id. at 744.
199. Id. at 769.
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insofar as customer satisfaction is crucial to an employer’s livelihood and is socially beneficial. A similar argument prevailed in
EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, where the EEOC alleged Sephora’s
rule requiring employees to speak English whenever clients
were present adversely impacted Hispanic employees. 200
Sephora responded, and the district court agreed, that the policy
constituted a business necessity as a matter of law because the
policy was not merely intended to satisfy customer preference
but was in fact indispensable to promoting politeness to customers. 201 In the customer feedback realm, an employer could similarly argue that its ability to consider customer feedback in making employment decisions is equally necessary to ensure
customer satisfaction.
A final problem with the disparate impact framework is that
establishing a statistically significant adverse impact almost always requires that a sufficiently large and diverse population be
affected by the challenged practice. 202 Indeed, courts have routinely held that an adverse effect on a single or a few employees
does not create a prima facie case of disparate impact as a matter
of law. 203 This not only precludes a plaintiff from asserting a disparate impact claim unless she is one of several employees af200. 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 409–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
201. Id. at 417.
202. See Selmi, Disparate Impact, supra note 180, at 769; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 462 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that disparate impact claims “cannot be based on how an individual is treated in isolation from the treatment of other members of the group” because “[s]uch claims
necessarily are based on whether the group fares less well than other groups
under a policy, practice, or test”).
203. See, e.g., Bramble v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO Providence
Local, 135 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Where an employer targets a single employee and implements a policy which has, to date, affected only that one employee, there is simply no basis for a disparate impact claim.”); Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that statistics
based on the departure of seventeen people lacked probative value in part because of the small sample size); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st
Cir. 1986) (holding that an adverse effect on a single or a few employees does
not create a prima facie case of disparate impact under the ADEA); Pace v. S.
Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary judgment in
ADEA case where the plaintiff ’s statistics were deficient because the sample
size of twelve was too small to be significant); Kolesnikow v. Hudson Valley
Hosp. Ctr., 622 F. Supp. 2d 98, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing cases noting that
smaller sample sizes allow for less persuasive inferences of discrimination to be
drawn); Jackson v. Univ. of New Haven, 228 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164–65 (D. Conn.
2002) (noting, in a disparate impact case involving sample size of fourteen people, that “exceedingly small sample sizes often result in statistically unreliable
evidence”).
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fected by the employer’s policy or practice, but also virtually ensures no employee who works for a smaller business—one-half
of today’s workforce 204—could realistically bring a disparate impact claim because of the difficulty of proving statistical significance. For instance, if Dr. Flowers asserts a disparate impact
claim against the clinic, she stands almost no chance of surviving
summary judgment because she was the only employee terminated under the facially neutral employment practice. Moreover,
even if Dr. Flowers had been one of several female doctors to lose
her job, proving statistical significance would be almost impossible unless the clinic employed hundreds of doctors, such that Dr.
Flowers could prove the clinic’s practice adversely impacted an
entire class.
In sum, although disparate impact may seem like a more
promising framework than disparate treatment for asserting
customer feedback discrimination claims, the theory is fraught
with limitations that diminish its attractiveness and utility.
Given the statutory restrictions on damages, the tendency of
courts to side with employers on the business necessity defense,
and the requirement of class-wide rather than individual discrimination, it is no wonder disparate impact claims rarely have
been asserted in employment discrimination cases. 205 For most
victims of customer feedback discrimination, these limitations
would likely render disparate impact not only unappealing but
outright untenable.

204. See ANTHONY CARUSO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G12-SUSB, STATISTICS
U.S. BUSINESSES EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL SUMMARY: 2012, at 1 (2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/econ/
g12-susb.pdf.
205. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998 n.57 (1991)
(finding disparate impact claims were asserted in less than two percent of employment discrimination cases in a 1987 study); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493, 499 (2003) (“As a practical matter, disparate impact litigation now
plays a much smaller role than it once did in increasing employment opportunities for large numbers of nonwhite workers.”); Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate
Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For?
What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (stating that disparate impact
claims are “a relatively less vital tool, compared with theories of intentional
discrimination.”).
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IV. A NEW APPROACH
To adequately protect employees from customer feedback
discrimination, a new approach is needed that gives victims realistic options for pursuing their claims beyond the traditional
disparate treatment/disparate impact binary. The current system is unacceptable because it effectively shuts out victims of
customer feedback discrimination from the legal system in most
scenarios. If Dr. Flowers asserts a disparate treatment claim,
she probably would win if she can prove the clinic knew the feedback was sexist. That is the good news. But under any other scenario her chances of success drop precipitously because of the
difficulty of proving the clinic’s discrimination was intentional.
Asserting a disparate impact claim would relieve Dr. Flowers
from proving intentional discrimination—her biggest barrier to
prevailing under the disparate treatment framework—yet it,
too, comes with its own set of problems that make it unlikely she
would prevail on such a claim.
That Dr. Flowers has almost no realistic path to recovery is
an indictment of the current state of employment discrimination
law. Title VII seeks to eradicate workplace discrimination by imposing on employers a duty to protect their employees from discrimination.206 This is true whether the discrimination is intentional or unintentional, conscious or unconscious.207 Dr.
Flowers’s inability to prove discrimination unless there is evidence the clinic knew the feedback was tainted conveys the message to employers and employees alike that subtle or inadvertent
discrimination is not as serious as more intentional discrimination. While on some level an employer may be less culpable for
unknowingly using customer feedback that does not appear on

206. See Lidwell v. Univ. Park Nursing Care Ctr., 116 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580
(M.D. Pa. 2000) (“[I]t may be said that an employer has a duty to protect employees from violations of Title VII.”); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as
a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed,
30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 402 (1998) (“ Title VII liability saddles employers with a
duty to protect its workers from the harmful acts of third parties, namely other
workers.”).
207. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“ Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination . . . as well as, in some cases, practices that
are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse
effect on minorities . . . .”); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st
Cir. 1999) (“ Title VII’s prohibition against ‘disparate treatment because of race’
extends both to employer acts based on conscious racial animus and to employer
decisions that are based on stereotyped thinking or other forms of less conscious
bias.”).
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its face to be biased, this does not change the fact that “the victims of unconscious discrimination have suffered the same economic damages, and often the same emotional damages, as the
victims of knowing bigotry.” 208 In fact, many scholars argue subtle discrimination is just as harmful as intentional discrimination, if not more so.209
The current legal framework is also untenable because it
does little to incentivize employers to carefully scrutinize customer feedback for bias. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress enacted Title VII to motivate employers “to self-examine
and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor
to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s history.” 210 As previously discussed, the threat of disparate impact liability is minimal, and employers have even less incentive to self-examine and
self-evaluate in the disparate treatment context, since the law
does not appear to impose on employers any duty to make themselves aware of biases in customer feedback. If unawareness constitutes an absolute defense to intentional discrimination, what
motivation would an employer have to review customer feedback
for signs of bias, much less engage expensive statisticians to sift
through the data in search of implicit bias?

208. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 916.
209. See, e.g., Peter A. Clark, Prejudice and the Medical Profession: A FiveYear Update, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 118, 118 (2009) (“It is clear that a subtle,
perhaps unconscious form of racism is just as harmful as expressed hatred and
bigotry . . . .”); Casey A. Kovacic, The Real BCS: Black Coach Syndrome and the
Pursuit to Become a College Head Football Coach, 36 S.U. L. REV. 89, 104 (2008)
(“Unconscious racism is not less harmful than intentional discrimination. In
fact, it may likely be more harmful because it is frequently unrecognizable by
the victim as well as the perpetrator.”); Samuel Noh et al., Overt and Subtle
Racial Discrimination and Mental Health: Preliminary Findings for Korean Immigrants, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1269, 1269–72 (2007) (finding that subtle racism can be more psychologically damaging than overt racism because recipients
can more easily shrug off overt discrimination, whereas subtle racism is more
likely to be committed by colleagues, neighbors, or friends, which causes recipients to feel that people do not like or accept them, thereby lowering self-esteem
and leading to depression); Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in
Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 271,
272–84 (2007) (concluding that invisibility and deniability of racial microaggressions make them especially problematic for recipients, who must try
to decide whether the discrimination was deliberate or unintentional); Eli Wald,
In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 461 (2012) (“Unintended and unintentional as implicit discrimination may be, it has real and harmful consequences
that must be addressed by legal means.”).
210. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975).
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Given the proliferation of customer feedback—and of both
explicit and implicit bias within that feedback—we cannot afford
to let customer feedback discrimination claims slip through the
cracks simply because they do not fit neatly under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact model of discrimination. 211
This is not a conundrum incapable of being solved. In truth, the
solution is quite simple: employers should be held to a negligence
standard in customer feedback discrimination cases, whereby
they would be liable if they knew, or had reason to know, the
feedback was biased and failed to act reasonably in response. As
I explain below, this standard would remedy many of the shortcomings of the extant frameworks in a manner that could appeal
to employers and employees alike. In Section A, I make the argument that applying a negligence standard to customer discrimination cases is hardly a radical proposition because negligence principles abound in other areas of employment
discrimination law. In Section B, I examine how a negligence
standard would be preferable to the disparate treatment/disparate impact dichotomy in determining which employers are truly
bad actors who warrant liability. In Section C, I consider how a
negligence standard could incentivize employers to be more
mindful and proactive in protecting employees from customer
feedback discrimination.
A. A FOUNDATION OF NEGLIGENCE
At first blush, applying a negligence standard to customer
feedback discrimination claims may seem a drastic departure
from Title VII jurisprudence. After all, the Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted “Title VII as providing tort-like actions
under theories of intentional tort [in disparate treatment cases]
and strict liability [in disparate impact cases].” 212 In her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, Justice O’Connor first referred
211. See Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 126 (2012) (“Remedies, proof patterns and available defenses all turn on whether liability is based on disparate treatment or
disparate impact, yet many troublesome situations cannot comfortably be analyzed in the treatment/impact framework.”); Zatz, supra note 3, at 1366 (criticizing the disparate treatment-disparate impact dichotomy as a “theoretical
straitjacket with two arms”).
212. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 918–19; see also Sandra F. Sperino,
Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1109–14 (2014)
[hereinafter Sperino, Let’s Pretend] (tracing how the Supreme Court has increasingly embraced tort law as a substantive framework for discrimination
law); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014)
(“[T]he Supreme Court repeatedly applies negligence concepts to discrimination
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to Title VII as a “statutory employment ‘tort.’” 213 Thereafter, in
Staub v. Proctor Hospital, a disparate treatment case, the Court
observed that “[i]ntentional torts such as this, ‘as distinguished
from negligent or reckless torts[,] . . . generally require that the
actor intend “the consequences[] of an act,” not simply “the act
itself.”’” 214 Yet for all the emphasis courts place on intentionality, there are several areas of discrimination law where negligence principles figure prominently into employer liability, 215 including the areas of harassment, accommodation, and disparate
impact.
The negligence standard is most readily apparent in how
courts assess employer liability for coworker harassment. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear in cases where “the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable
only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.” 216 Under this standard, harassment decisions do not focus on intent to
do wrong but rather on the employer’s failure to do right.217 David Oppenheimer explains that “[t]he employer is liable not because it wanted the harm to occur, or helped bring about its occurrence, but because the law imposed on it a duty of care to
protect its employees from co-employee harassment, and it failed
to take the necessary steps to protect them.” 218 It is significant
that courts analyze harassment claims under the disparate
treatment framework, 219 yet within that framework allow a

claims, even though it also claims that disparate treatment claims require proof
of intent.”).
213. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
214. 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,
61–62 (1998)).
215. See Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 899 (“[T]he existing law of employment discrimination, while eschewing the term negligence, frequently incorporates the doctrine.”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110
MICH. L. REV. 69, 99 (2011) (“[I]deas of negligence abound within the accepted
discrimination frameworks.”); Weiss, supra note 211, at 124 (“Although negligence theories are not well-recognized under Title VII, they have some basis in
existing law.”).
216. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
217. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 950.
218. Id. at 966.
219. See Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 n.4
(11th Cir. 2010) (analyzing hostile work environment claim under disparate
treatment framework); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Under Title VII, a hostile work environment is one form of disparate treatment . . . .”); Roberts v. Archbold Med. Ctr., 220 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1334 (M.D.
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plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination by showing mere
negligence on the employer’s part.
Though less explicit, negligence principles are also present
in accommodation law. In certain instances, it is not enough that
an employer simply refrains from discriminating against an employee; the employer has an affirmative duty to provide a reasonable accommodation to the employee. This is true where an
employee’s religion, 220 disability, 221 or, in some instances, pregnancy 222 conflicts with job requirements. Oppenheimer explains
that “an employer may be subjected to liability not because of
any affirmative or intentionally discriminatory steps it has
taken” but because it failed “to act affirmatively to protect employees or applicants from harm when it had a duty to do so.
Liability cannot be explained under a theory of intentional
wrong, nor of strict liability. The analogous common law tort is
negligence.” 223
A final area of discrimination law where negligence principles are apparent is in the less-discriminatory-alternative test
available in disparate impact cases. Under this test, a plaintiff
may still succeed on a disparate impact claim even if the employer proves the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity “by showing that the employer
refuses to adopt an available alternative practice that has less
disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.” 224
This test “encourages the consideration of a negligence theory of
employment discrimination,” insofar as employer liability is
premised on a breach of the employer’s duty to avoid disparate
impact by “failing to adopt a less discriminatory alternative
where such an alternative was available.” 225
The pervasiveness of negligence principles in Title VII jurisprudence has prompted several commentators to call for the extension of the negligence standard to other areas of discrimination law. For example, Deborah Weiss argues employers should
be held to a negligence standard for intentional discrimination
Ga. 2016) (“[A] sexual harassment claim is not a unique type of disparate treatment.”); Jackson v. Deen, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1352 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (“[A] claim
for a hostile work environment is a form of disparate treatment.”).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
221. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B).
222. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015).
223. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 944.
224. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).
225. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 932–34.
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by supervisors in structural pattern-or-practice cases. 226 Jessie
Allen urges the application of negligence to cases of “unthinking”
discrimination.227 Elizabeth Cramer claims courts should apply
a negligence standard to coworker retaliation cases. 228 And Oppenheimer advocates for the application of negligence to employment discrimination claims more generally.229
The relative ease with which negligence principles have
been incorporated into discrimination law both in theory and in
practice shows the feasibility of their application to customer
feedback discrimination. But even though the application of a
negligence standard does not appear to present any serious challenges doctrinally, its desirability hinges on whether the standard would have the power to produce actual results that are consistent with Title VII’s goal of eradicating discrimination from
the workplace. I argue in Sections B and C that in fact, this is
precisely what a negligence standard would accomplish.
B. ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF DISCRIMINATORY
FEEDBACK
Far and away, the most formidable barrier to proving customer feedback discrimination under the disparate treatment
framework is showing the employer intended to discriminate.
While explicitly discriminatory feedback certainly is not unheard of,230 the reality is that customers often express their biases in discrete, subtle, and even unconscious ways that cannot
easily be detected 231—especially for employers lacking the sophisticated statistical training or elaborate feedback instruments and methodologies required to spot such bias. But that
should not excuse employers from at least making reasonable efforts to identify tainted feedback, given the reality that a victim

226. Weiss, supra note 211, at 136–46.
227. See generally Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299 (1995).
228. Elizabeth A. Cramer, Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: Retaliatory Actions by Coworkers and the Fifth Circuit’s Narrow Standard for Employer
Liability, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 591, 601–04 (2013).
229. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 969 (“From these well recognized instances of negligence liability under Title VII, it is but a small step to a general
application of the principle. Whenever an employer fails to act to prevent discrimination which it knows, or should know, is occurring, which it expects to
occur, or which it should expect to occur, it should be held negligent.”).
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See supra Part II.B.
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of customer feedback discrimination suffers as much harm regardless of whether bias is explicit or implicit.232 At present, the
law actually dissuades employers from making such efforts; if an
employer does not know the feedback is biased, how can it be
said that the employer intended to discriminate? Of course a
plaintiff could always assert a disparate impact claim, but the
dismal success rate of such claims outside the testing and seniority contexts 233 makes it unlikely an employer would take the
threat of disparate impact liability seriously enough to alter its
behavior.
At the same time, strict liability seems neither a realistic
nor appropriate answer. If an employer were liable any time a
plaintiff could show that even one answer to a single survey was
implicitly biased, thus causing a protected trait to motivate the
employment decision, the employer may cease soliciting feedback from customers altogether. Although this would probably
be welcome news to some weary consumers who are fed up with
unending feedback requests, extinguishing customers’ voices
and, consequently, their power seems too drastic of a measure.
Customer satisfaction is an important driver of firms’ practices
in the modern economy,234 and the law should not discourage it
from remaining so to the extent it does not run afoul of antidiscrimination measures.
A negligence standard would strike an appropriate balance
by imposing on employers a reasonable but not overly burdensome duty to detect bias in customer feedback. Under this standard, an employer could no longer plead ignorance. If Dr. Flowers’s feedback contained sexist comments from survey
respondents, the clinic could not avoid liability simply because it
declined to read such comments. Even though the clinic did not
know the feedback was biased, it could have—and should have—
known so because evidence of the bias was readily apparent and
could easily have been detected. Subjecting the clinic to a negli-

232. See sources cited supra note 209.
233. See generally Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (discussing the general difficulty of winning employment discrimination and disparate impact claims along
with possible reasons for those difficulties).
234. J.A.F. Nicholls et al., Parsimonious Measurement of Customer Satisfaction with Personal Service and the Service Setting, 15 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 239, 239 (1998) (“Customers are the lifeblood of any organization, be it private sector business or public-sector government, because consumer satisfaction
is the key to continued organizational survival.”).
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gence standard should motivate the clinic to examine the feedback for signs of bias before relying on it. And yet the standard
is not so onerous that the clinic would have to subject the feedback to round after round of expensive and time-consuming bias
testing, which could potentially disincentivize an employer from
seeking customer feedback altogether. In short, a negligence
standard would advantage plaintiffs by allowing them to prove
intent through constructive rather than actual knowledge, while
at the same time only requiring employers to take reasonable
measures to gain such knowledge.
The biggest question left open by the imposition of a reasonable-knowledge standard is what the standard would actually
require from employers in customer feedback discrimination
cases. The beauty—and the curse—of this standard is its highly
fact-intensive nature. What constitutes reasonable knowledge
would be decided case by case, based on factors such as the employer’s sophistication level, the characteristics of the workforce,
and the type of feedback solicited. Still, as with any reasonableness standard, over time the case law could help define the general parameters of when an employer should have known feedback was biased. Employee harassment cases could be helpful in
this regard since they, too, hold employers to a negligence standard.235 But perhaps even more instructive is the more factually
analogous line of cases involving joint-employer staffing agencies. Such cases typically involve a staffing agency that did not
independently engage in discrimination but was nevertheless
subject to liability for the discriminatory conduct of a joint-employer client if the agency knew or should have known of the client’s discrimination but failed to take corrective measures
within its control. 236 For example, in Nicholson v. Securitas Security Services, USA, Inc., Helen Nicholson brought an age discrimination action against Securitas, the staffing agency that
employed her, after the agency removed her from a receptionist
235. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1988).
236. See Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 228–29 (5th
Cir. 2015); Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cty., 772 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2014);
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT
WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING FIRMS (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/conting.html (“ The firm is
liable if it participates in the client’s discrimination. For example, if the firm
honors its client’s request to remove a worker from a job assignment for a discriminatory reason and replace him or her with an individual outside the
worker ’s protected class, the firm is liable for the discriminatory discharge. The
firm also is liable if it knew or should have known about the client’s discrimination and failed to undertake prompt corrective measures within its control.”).
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position at the request of the agency’s client.237 The Fifth Circuit
reversed summary judgment for the agency upon determining
that a fact issue persisted as to whether the agency should have
known the client’s reason for requesting Nicholson’s reassignment was discriminatory because the agency deviated from its
standard operating procedures by failing to investigate the circumstances of the client’s reassignment request and by not asking Nicholson for an explanation before removing her from the
client site. 238 Because the client’s reassignment request is a form
of customer feedback, Nicholson could be helpful in the customer
feedback discrimination context if, for instance, an employer ordinarily scanned feedback for certain discriminatory code words
but failed to do so in a particular instance.
Perhaps the most significant advantage of a reasonableknowledge standard is its flexibility in adapting to social and
technological changes.239 Whether an employer reasonably
should know customer feedback is biased has changed, and will
continue to change, over time—both as definitions of discrimination evolve and as the methods for detecting discrimination become more refined. When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 over five decades ago, our conceptualization of discrimination was markedly different than it is today. 240 Discrimination
was only actionable if it was based on race, color, sex, religion or
national origin. 241 Other characteristics, such as pregnancy, 242

237. 830 F.3d 186, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2016).
238. Id. at 190–91.
239. See Sperino, Let’s Pretend, supra note 212, at 1125–26 (“If discrimination law is truly a tort, it should retain the flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances over time, including new understandings of how discrimination occurs.”).
240. See Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law:
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 942–
53 (tracing the history of how employment discrimination doctrine has changed
in response to changing social conceptions); see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 423, 474–81 (2002) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act was “clear[ly]” intended as an antidifferentiation principle); Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and
Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII
Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin,
37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 772 (1996) (“Over time, Title VII generally has been able to
accommodate changing concepts of discrimination.”).
241. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213 (1968).
242. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
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military status,243 disability, 244 age, 245 and genetics,246 did not
receive protection until decades later. Even within the protected
classes that did exist early on, discrimination was thought of
very differently than it is today. For instance, it took several
years for the Supreme Court to recognize the possibility of reverse race discrimination 247 or same-sex harassment. 248 Had a
reasonable-knowledge standard applied since Title VII’s inception, the types of customer biases that an employer should have
known about would have been different than what they would
be today. Likewise, as antidiscrimination statutes extend their
protections to other characteristics in the future—perhaps to
sexual orientation, 249 criminal background,250 and physical appearance 251—the reasonable knowledge standard would expand
to require employers to look for these types of biases as well.
An employer’s duty to realize customer feedback is biased
would also increase as scientific advances make it easier to understand and detect new forms of discrimination. When overt
discrimination was more socially acceptable decades ago, a court
applying a negligence standard may have found it perfectly reasonable for an employer to scan customer feedback only for explicit signs of bias because that is how customers likely would
have expressed their biases. Today, a court may rightfully find
these same efforts unreasonable in light of our understanding
that changing norms have resulted in less overt expressions of
discrimination. In fact, given the prevalence of bias in customer
feedback today, a plausible argument could be made that an employer should always have reason to know its feedback is likely
243. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012).
244. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
245. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
246. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff.
247. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
248. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
249. See Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing to amend
Title VII to extend protection against sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination).
250. See generally Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence:
Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45
(2015) (arguing Title VII should be amended to include criminal background as
a protected trait in some instances).
251. See, e.g., Sarah E. Friedricks, Note, Sexy Sex Discrimination: Why Appearance-Based Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination, 40 J. CORP. L. 503, 516–
19 (2015) (arguing that Title VII should prohibit appearance-based discrimination as a type of sex discrimination).
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biased, particularly if it employs women, older workers, or racial
minorities.
As social-science research on implicit bias is still in its infancy, 252 there remains much to learn about how such bias manifests itself—particularly in the customer feedback arena, where
research on how biases skew customers’ perceptions is finally
gaining traction after years of neglect. 253 At present, implicit
bias is difficult to detect unless a survey instrument is sufficiently sophisticated to capture the type of advanced data that
lends itself to the complicated statistical analyses necessary to
uncover implicit bias. 254 Even then, the validity of the results
can be controversial.255 Given the current difficulties of proving
implicit bias, it seems unlikely a court would require an employer to go to the expensive and time-consuming lengths required to detect implicit bias with statistical precision. While
such testing may become more reasonable in the future, as analytical models become more streamlined, for the time being perhaps less onerous measures that have been shown to reduce bias
could be required for an employer to demonstrate it had no reason to suspect the feedback was biased. Such measures might
include, for example, “increasing information, responsibility, or
training for raters” or statistically adjusting customer ratings to
252. See Allison Fisher, Note, Using California State Anti-Discrimination
Law to Combat the Overuse of School Suspensions, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1207
(2015) (noting that social science research on implicit bias is still in its infancy);
John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt:
A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 39, 43 (2009) (detailing the evolution of implicit bias research and explaining “[b]y the early-1980s, the scientific consensus regarding the importance and ubiquity of nonconscious, highly efficient, and automatized cognition was firmly established”).
253. See Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 239 (noting that although other
researchers had studied biases in supervisory ratings, this 2010 study was the
first to examine “bias in customer judgments of organizational context or overall
work unit”).
254. See Bertram Gawronski & Galen V. Bodenhausen, What Do We Know
About Implicit Attitude Measures and What Do We Have to Learn?, in IMPLICIT
MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 265, 280 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds.,
2007) (detailing the difficulty of measuring implicit bias); Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J.
765, 820–22 (2017) (explaining the various “sophisticated techniques” psychologists have developed to measure implicit bias).
255. See Tom Bartlett, Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Can
-We-Really-Measure-Implicit/238807 (detailing new research showing the link
between implicit bias and biased behaviors may be overstated).

2018]

CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION

2223

remove or minimize bias. 256 Although such measures could not
guarantee bias-free feedback, they could be enough—at least for
now—for an employer to legitimately argue that it neither knew,
nor had reason to know, the feedback was biased.
C. REASONABLE RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATORY FEEDBACK
Under the proposed negligence standard, an employer who
knows, or reasonably should know, customer feedback is biased
would have a duty to take reasonable measures to remedy the
discrimination. Like in harassment cases, where employers with
actual or constructive knowledge of harassment have a remedial
duty, liability would not necessarily hinge on an employer’s ability to eliminate the discrimination altogether but rather its reasonable efforts to do so. 257 What constitutes reasonable efforts
largely depends on the employer’s level of knowledge; the more
an employer knows its customer feedback is biased, the greater
the employer’s duty would be to take steps to remedy that
bias. 258 In cases where an employer is unaware but should have
known the feedback was biased, it would make little sense to focus on the employer’s corrective practices, since the employer
was unaware of the bias in the first place. Instead, a court might
examine whether the employer took reasonable preventive
measures to guard against relying on biased feedback in making
employment decisions. By contrast, in cases where an employer
strongly suspects or actually knows feedback is biased, assessing
256. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 259.
257. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 473 (7th Cir. 2011), aff ’d,
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (“Of course, the ideal result of an employee’s complaint
would be that the harassment ceases. But Title VII does not require an employer ’s response to ‘successfully prevent[ ] subsequent harassment,’ though it
should be reasonably calculated to do so.” (quoting Cerros v. Steel Techs. Inc.,
398 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005))); Neely v. McDonald’s Corp., 340 F. App’x 83,
86 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that remedial action is adequate so long as it is reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment, regardless of whether it actually succeeds in doing so); Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965,
976 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An employer ’s response to alleged instances of employee
harassment must be reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment under the particular facts and circumstances of the case at the time the allegations
are made. We are not to focus solely upon whether the remedial activity ultimately succeeded, but instead should determine whether the employer ’s total
response was reasonable under the circumstances as then existed.” (quoting
Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2001))).
258. See McDaniel v. Elgin, No. 2:09 cv 119, 2011 WL 5006313, at *8 (N.D.
Ind. Oct. 19, 2011) (“ The reasonableness of the employer ’s response depends on
the severity of the harassment and how much the employer knows about the
alleged harassment.”).
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the employer’s preventive practices would be pointless since the
employer knows or is at least fairly certain its preventive
measures failed. A court might instead scrutinize what efforts
the employer took after becoming aware of the bias to reasonably
prevent the tainted feedback from affecting its employment decisions.
The notion that an employer can fulfill its reasonable response duty through either preventive or corrective practices
constitutes a small but necessary departure from the employer’s
remedial duty in harassment cases, where most courts seem to
require an employer to engage in both preventive and corrective
practices. 259 Unlike harassment cases, which typically involve a
series of harassing events, some occurring before the employer
becomes aware of the harassment and some occurring after the
fact, 260 customer feedback discrimination claims are likely to involve a single employment decision. It would be unfair to require
both preventive and corrective measures in this scenario because
the employer either is unaware the feedback is biased, in which
case it could not engage in any corrective action, or the employer
is aware of the bias, in which case the employer’s corrective actions would be more important than its preventive practices.
Where an employer has constructive rather than actual
knowledge that its feedback is biased, what preventive measures
could the employer reasonably be expected to take to avoid liability? Again, the standard would likely change over time as we
learn more about how implicit biases operate in the customer
feedback context. For now, reasonable preventive measures
might include efforts such as requiring customers to provide
their names and contact information on feedback forms, which
has been proven to reduce bias; soliciting in-person feedback
259. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (noting
that an employer may escape liability for harassment if it “exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior ”); Debord v. Mercy Health
Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 653 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that an employer ’s
defense to a harassment claim “actually imposes two distinct requirements on
an employer: (1) the employer must have exercised reasonable care to prevent
sexual harassment and (2) the employer must have exercised reasonable care
to correct promptly any sexual harassment that occurred.” (quoting Helm v.
Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1288 (10th Cir. 2011))). But see Baldwin v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that an
employer ’s duty is to “prevent or correct” harassment); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
260. See, e.g., Gentile v. Des Properties, Inc., No. 3:08CV2330, 2010 WL
597433, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010) (claiming the employer was aware that
the plaintiff had been harassed but allowed the harassment to continue).
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through interviews and focus groups rather than by phone, internet, or mail; asking for both quantitative and qualitative feedback; only using customer feedback after a sufficiently large and
diverse dataset is obtained; using computer programs or other
tools to identify word patterns that reflect bias in written comments; having a statistician analyze customer feedback for signs
of bias; requiring raters to provide their sex and race on feedback
forms to facilitate the comparison of an employee’s ratings across
race and sex; educating customers about the dangers of implicit
bias; and providing training or other specific guidelines to customers on how to accurately rate employees. Even if these
measures do not completely eradicate bias from customer feedback, a court may find they were reasonably calculated to do so,
which is all a negligence standard can and should require of employers.
If an employer actually knows or strongly suspects its feedback is biased, it could avoid liability only by showing it engaged
in corrective practices reasonably designed to prevent the
tainted feedback from infiltrating its employment decisions. Of
course, the best way to assure this is by discarding the feedback
altogether, in which case there would be no need for a lawsuit.
Other reasonable corrective measures might include only considering feedback from customers of the employee’s same race and
sex, 261 attempting to neutralize bias by statistically adjusting
customer ratings, 262 revising how customer feedback factors into
employment decisions, gathering alternative feedback using the
aforementioned preventive measures, and removing outlier responses from feedback datasets. Again, none of these corrective
practices is foolproof, but under a negligence standard, they need
not be so. An employer could avoid liability by making reasonable efforts to remedy the discrimination.
Returning to the introductory hypothetical, if Dr. Flowers
could prove the clinic should have known her patient feedback
261. This response may not be entirely foolproof, given the social science evidence that blacks sometimes discriminate against other blacks and women
sometimes discriminate against other women in rating their employment performance. See Lynn et al., supra note 109, at 1054–55 (finding that white and
black restaurant customers tipped black servers less on average than white
servers); see also Brewster & Lynn, supra note 110 (same); Sterling, supra note
103 (finding that male and female attorneys rated female judges lower than
male judges on a variety of personal attributes).
262. See Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 259 (suggesting that “organizations
can perhaps measure and discount such biases or statistically adjust the ratings
to remove the bias”).
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was sexist (perhaps if early on, the clinic noticed a major discrepancy between her peer evaluations and her patient ratings), the
clinic’s liability would hinge on the reasonableness of its preventive measures, such as requiring patient raters to provide their
contact information, warning patients of the dangers of implicit
bias, and training patients on how to accurately rate their doctors. On the other hand, if the clinic knew the feedback was biased (perhaps if some of the patients wrote sexist comments at
the bottom of their surveys), it could only avoid liability if it took
reasonable measures to correct the bias, such as resurveying Dr.
Flowers’s patients using methods less susceptible to bias, excluding male respondents’ feedback from Dr. Flowers’s overall ratings or otherwise statistically adjusting the ratings to neutralize
the effects of the bias.
CONCLUSION
Customer feedback discrimination is a pressing problem
that will likely become even worse unless the law provides a
more effective framework for litigating such claims. In today’s
hypercompetitive business environment, customer feedback is
invaluable because of the insights it can offer firms about how to
attract, satisfy, and retain customers. 263 The high value firms
place on customer feedback is evident in the ubiquity of their
feedback solicitations, as consumers are bombarded with feedback requests seemingly every time they speak with a customer
service representative, open a webpage, or eat out. This is not a
trend that is likely to subside any time soon; in fact, technological advances are making it cheaper and easier to reach more customers faster and more intimately than ever before.
Customer feedback can be unreliable due to serious flaws in
how the data is collected and analyzed, and because customers’
perceptions often are skewed by explicit and implicit biases that
impede their ability to fairly and accurately rate their experiences. Both problems are serious in their own right, but the latter is particularly disconcerting because employers often factor
263. See, e.g., Jay Baer, 7 Ways to Mine the Hidden Gold in Your Customer
Data, CONVINCE & CONVERT (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.convinceandconvert
.com/digital-marketing/7-ways-to-mine-the-hidden-gold-in-your-customer
-data; Aneesh Reddy, Customer Feedback Is a Pot of Gold, DMN (May 2, 2014),
http://www.dmnews.com/customer-experience/customer-feedback-is-a-pot-of
-gold/article/344837; James White, Customer Feedback: Worth Its Weight in
Gold, INTOUCH (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.intouchcrm.com/customer-feedback
-worth-its-weight-in-gold.
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customer feedback into major employment decisions. If the feedback is biased, the employer has allowed its customers’ discriminatory preferences to color its employment decisions—an unequivocal violation of federal antidiscrimination laws. 264
Although this is a serious and potentially widespread problem, it has not received the attention it deserves because the law
does not provide victims of customer feedback discrimination
with a viable path to recovery in most instances due to the courts’
rigid adherence to the disparate treatment and disparate impact
frameworks. Remedying this problem does not require a complete overhaul of the law but instead simply necessitates the application of a negligence standard, as has been done in other areas of employment discrimination law. 265 A negligence standard
offers a sensible solution that would provide victims of customer
feedback discrimination a realistic pathway to recovery without
overly burdening employers. The reasonable-knowledge component would allow a plaintiff to prevail by showing the employer
knew or should have known the feedback was biased. It would
also incentivize employers to make appropriate efforts to detect
customer bias rather than looking the other way so it cannot be
said that they intentionally discriminated. At the same time, the
reasonable-knowledge requirement is not so stringent that it
would deter employers from soliciting customer feedback altogether or otherwise unduly burden business operations. Moreover, the reasonable response component of the negligence standard is likewise preferable to the current scheme because it would
properly motivate employers to take appropriate precautionary
and remedial measures against customer bias.
If we are ever to achieve Title VII’s goal of eradicating discrimination from the workplace, we must provide victims of all
types of employment discrimination with a viable path to recovery. At present, the law is failing victims of customer feedback
discrimination simply because this form of discrimination does
not fit neatly under either the disparate treatment or disparate
impact framework. Rather than allowing these claims to fall
through the cracks, the courts should apply a negligence standard to customer feedback discrimination claims by imposing liability on an employer if the employer knew, or should have
known, the feedback was biased and failed to take reasonable
preventive or corrective measures in response. As customer feed264. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also cases cited supra note 44.
265. See supra Part IV.A.
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back is likely to play an even more prominent role in employment decisions in the future, this standard will help protect employees from the “evils of employment discrimination” 266—just
as the Civil Rights Act and other antidiscrimination statutes intended.

266. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983) (“ The
primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and Title VII in particular, is remedial.
Its aim is to eliminate employment discrimination by creating a federal cause
of action to promote and effectuate its goals. To effectuate its purpose of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal
construction.” (internal citations omitted)).

